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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
METHODS FOR MODELING AND ANALYZING CONCURRENT SOFTWARE
by
Reng Zeng
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Xudong He, Major Professor
Concurrent software executes multiple threads or processes to achieve high perfor-
mance. However, concurrency results in a huge number of diﬀerent system behaviors
that are diﬃcult to test and verify. The aim of this dissertation is to develop new
methods and tools for modeling and analyzing concurrent software systems at de-
sign and code levels. This dissertation consists of several related results. First, a
formal model of Mondex, an electronic purse system, is built using Petri nets from
user requirements, which is formally veriﬁed using model checking. Second, Petri
nets models are automatically mined from the event traces generated from scientiﬁc
workﬂows. Third, partial order models are automatically extracted from some in-
strumented concurrent program execution, and potential atomicity violation bugs
are automatically veriﬁed based on the partial order models using model checking.
Our formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of Mondex have contributed to the
world wide eﬀort in developing a veriﬁed software repository. Our method to mine
Petri net models automatically from provenance oﬀers a new approach to build
scientiﬁc workﬂows. Our dynamic prediction tool, named McPatom, can predict
several known bugs in real world systems including one that evades several other
existing tools. McPatom is eﬃcient and scalable as it takes advantage of the nature
of atomicity violations and considers only a pair of threads and accesses to a single
shared variable at one time. However, predictive tools need to consider the tradeoﬀs
vi
between precision and coverage. Based on McPatom, this dissertation presents two
methods for improving the coverage and precision of atomicity violation predictions:
1) a post-prediction analysis method to increase coverage while ensuring precision;
2) a follow-up replaying method to further increase coverage. Both methods are
implemented in a completely automatic tool.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Concurrent software execute multiple threads or processes to achieve high perfor-
mance. However, concurrency results in a huge number of diﬀerent system behaviors
that are diﬃcult to test and verify. The aim of this dissertation is to develop new
methods and tools for modeling and analyzing concurrent software systems at de-
sign and code levels. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the work in this dissertation,
from the perspective of design level and code level, as well as forward engineering
and reverse engineering. This dissertation ﬁrstly focuses on the design level, makes
a shift from forward engineering to reverse engineering, then focuses on atomicity
violation bugs where reverse engineering is very useful for analysis.
Figure 1.1: Overview of this dissertation (Contributions in this dissertation are
highlighted in green background)
1
1.1 Motivation
In recent years, both the Computing Research Association in the U.S. and the UK
Computing Research Committee proposed a set of grand challenges in computing
sciences. These grand challenges involve great technical diﬃculties and have tremen-
dous signiﬁcance. One common grand challenge proposed by the above organizations
is on developing dependable software systems [1]. One of the research themes of this
grand challenge is to develop a veriﬁed software repository [2]. The Mondex smart
card, an electronic purse, was chosen as the ﬁrst pilot project in 2006. The ob-
jectives were to demonstrate how research groups can collaborate and compete in
scientiﬁc experiments, and to generate artifacts to populate the veriﬁed software
repository [3]. This dissertation contributes to the world wide eﬀort in developing
a veriﬁed software repository by: developing a formal model of Mondex using Petri
nets and temporal logic, then applying model checking techniques to analyze the
formal model. On the other hand, formal models are often missing or incomplete,
therefore this dissertation develops methods to build formal models automatically
for scientiﬁc workﬂows. In many disciplines, individual workﬂows are large, due to
the large quantities of data used, so it is often very hard to create and maintain
scientiﬁc workﬂows.
Scientiﬁc computing has entered a new era of large scaled sharing provided by the
cyberinfrastructure. Scientiﬁc workﬂows have recently emerged as a new paradigm
for declarative representation of scientiﬁc applications as complex compositions of
software components and the dataﬂow among them [4]. Recent eﬀorts from the
scientiﬁc workﬂow community aiming at large-scale capturing of provenance present
a new opportunity for using provenance to provide recommendation during creating
or updating scientiﬁc workﬂows. Provenance, in the scientiﬁc workﬂow community,
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refers to the sources of information, including entities and processes, involved in
producing or delivering an artifact. Provenance is important for scientists to assess
data quality, validate results, and reproduce experiments. Consequently provenance
capture becomes an important scientiﬁc workﬂow research area. Many existing sci-
entiﬁc workﬂow management systems, such as Taverna [5], Kepler [6], VisTrails
[7] and Pegasus [8], capture provenance information implicitly in an event log that
records events related to the start and end of particular steps in the workﬂow exe-
cution and the corresponding data read and write events. Based on provenance of
a combination of system-level monitoring and workﬂow-based systems, this disser-
tation aims at providing a general method to mine workﬂows from provenance to
aid designing scientiﬁc workﬂows. Besides mining models from traces to aid model
building, this dissertation goes a step further to analyze models built on traces.
An interesting concurrent software to explore the methods of building models then
analyzing models automatically is multi-threaded programs.
Multi-threaded programs are the most diﬃcult ones to develop and verify because
of the huge interleaving space. Multi-core hardware is a growing industry trend,
for both high performance servers and low power mobile devices. Multi-threaded
programs can exploit multi-core processors at their full potential. Therefore, multi-
threaded programs are desired to improve performance. And in the real world, most
servers and high-end critical software are multi-threaded. Unfortunately, multi-
threaded programs are prone to bugs due to the inherent complexity caused by
concurrency. It is diﬃcult to detect concurrency bugs due to the huge number of
possible interleavings. Many concurrency bugs escape from testing into software
releases and cause some of the most serious computer-related accidents in history,
including a blackout leaving tens of millions of people without electricity [9]. Among
diﬀerent types of concurrency bugs, atomicity violation bugs are the most common
3
one. Atomicity violation bugs are caused by violations to the atomicity of certain
code regions without proper synchronization. They widely exist in the real world
systems and contributed to about 70% of the examined non-deadlock concurrency
bugs [10]. Therefore, techniques for detecting atomicity violation bugs are extremely
important. Toward dependable software systems, this dissertation proposes methods
to analyze multi-threaded programs at the code level using model checking to ﬁnd
atomicity violation bugs.
1.2 Model Checking
Testing is an essential part of each software development process, but cannot ensure
every possible scenario is covered. In concurrent systems, it is even more diﬃcult
to test every possible scenario due to non-determinism, making concurrency bugs
the most troublesome in all types of software bugs. Nowadays, it is becoming more
and more important to address concurrency bugs with the prevalence of multi-core
hardware and concurrent programs. As concurrency bugs are non-deterministic,
only exposed on speciﬁc thread or process scheduling, they are hard to trigger. This
frustrates both testing and reproduction for bug diagnosis.
Model checking is an automatic and eﬃcient method for analyzing ﬁnite state
systems, to verify whether a given model satisﬁes given properties, by exhaustive ex-
ploration of non-determinism. To use model checking, one has to formulate both the
model and desired properties of a system into some precise mathematical language,
that is a formal speciﬁcation. For example, Petri nets or Promela can be used to
model a system while temporal logic can be used to specify the properties desired.
The analysis work in this dissertation is based on model checking techniques.
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1.3 Contributions
This dissertation addresses the following work, as highlighted in green in Figure 1.1.
All work attempts to improve software reliability using model checking techniques,
while the initial work is based on building models manually and the following-up
work aim at building models automatically, respectively, in the area of scientiﬁc
workﬂows and atomicity violation bugs.
Model checking Petri nets at the design level This dissertation presents a
unique solution to the grand challenge Mondex, by specifying Mondex with high level
Petri nets and temporal logic, and oﬀering a new systematic method to translate high
level Petri net to Promela. Our formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of Mondex
have contributed to the world wide eﬀort in developing a veriﬁed software repository.
This work is based on models built manually.
Automatically building Petri net models from provenance Aiming at build-
ing models in Petri nets automatically, this part of the dissertation presents a method
based on provenance to mine models for scientiﬁc workﬂows, including data and con-
trol dependency. The mining result can either suggest part of other workﬂows for
consideration, or make familiar parts of workﬂow easily accessible, thus providing
recommendation support for scientiﬁc workﬂow composition. This oﬀers a new ap-
proach to build workﬂows in the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows. Given the fact
that provenance captured in any scientiﬁc workﬂow based systems or system level
monitoring systems contains information about tasks and their temporal order, the
proposed algorithm can give both control and data dependency for recommendation
during scientiﬁc workﬂows composition. The method provided in this dissertation
can be applied to any scientiﬁc workﬂow management systems.
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Automatically building models from traces of program execution Our
method checking formal models in Petri nets requires translation from Petri nets to
Promela code, this part of the dissertation considering building models in Promela
code directly in the context of atomicity violation bugs. I present a method to
extract a thread model from an instrumented interleaved trace that only records
events related to atomicity violations. Such an interleaved trace is much smaller
than the program behavior in a complete execution. Furthermore the extracted
thread model enables the checking of all alternative traces with the same causal
relationships as the interleaved trace. The completeness of instrumented interleaved
traces and the extracted thread models is proved.
Model checking atomicity violation at code level This dissertation presents
a complete set of the patterns of unserializable interleavings involving two threads
(most concurrency bugs involve only two threads [11]) containing any number of
accesses to a shared variable (either user deﬁned or every word sized dynamically
allocated memory accessed by multiple threads). These patterns generalize and
cover the three accesses proposed in [10][12]. These atomicity violation patterns
become property speciﬁcations to be checked. Based on the extracted model and
the property speciﬁcations, this dissertation oﬀers a unique prediction tool - Mc-
Patom, for detecting atomicity violation bugs through model checking. McPatom
instruments interleaved executions, extracts thread models from interleaved traces,
automatically converts (1) thread models into Promela programs and (2) atomicity
violation patterns into property speciﬁcations. By constraining the checking within
a pair of threads involving one shared variable at a time, the interleaving space to
be checked is vastly reduced. As a result, McPatom is applicable to large software
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systems. McPatom can predict atomicity violations that do not manifest during
testing or runtime.
Improving the coverage and precision of atomicity violation prediction
Predictive methods and tools need to consider the tradeoﬀs between precision and
coverage. An imprecise tool may report a large number of false positives and thus
is not very useful since it is extremely time-consuming if not impossible to man-
ually validate all false positives. On the other hand, a tool lacking coverage can
miss signiﬁcant real bugs and thus provides no assurance for software reliability.
This dissertation presents two methods for improving the coverage and precision of
atomicity violation predictions: 1) a post-prediction analysis method on relaxing the
under-approximate models to increase coverage while ensuring precision; and 2) a
follow-up replaying method to further increase coverage. The post-prediction anal-
ysis method is lightweight and fast, and makes the precise predictions and achieves
better coverage than other existing methods using under-approximate models. The
replaying method reduces context switches to the minimal level to improve scalabil-
ity. Both methods are implemented in a completely automatic tool.
1.4 Chapter Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents our
work in model checking Mondex, a grand challenge project, at the design level using
Petri nets. Chapter 3 presents a method to build models in Petri nets automatically
in the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows. Chapter 4 describes our predictive analysis
tool for atomicity violation using model checking at code level. Chapter 5 explains
methods for improving the coverage and precision of atomicity violation prediction.
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CHAPTER 2
ANALYZING PETRI NETS USING MODEL CHECKING
In this chapter we build a formal speciﬁcation of Mondex using Petri nets, and
provide a way of using model checking to verify the formal speciﬁcation of Mondex,
including the abstract model and concrete model.
2.1 Overview
In recent years, both the Computing Research Association in the U.S. and the UK
Computing Research Committee proposed a set of grand challenges in computing
sciences. One common grand challenge proposed by the above organizations is on
developing dependable software systems [1] [2]. The Mondex smart card, an elec-
tronic purse, was chosen as the 1st pilot project in 2006. The objectives were to
demonstrate how research groups can collaborate and compete in scientiﬁc experi-
ments, and to generate artifacts to populate the veriﬁed software repository [3].
Mondex is a payment system, an electronic purse system, based on smart card
technology, which oﬀers an alternative to paying cash for goods and services, allow-
ing person-to-person payment. In 1999, Mondex was awarded a security rating of
ITSEC Level E6 [13] - the highest possible rating achievable in ITSEC (Information
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria).
During the development of Mondex, Z was used to specify and to prove the
correctness of Mondex design [14]. Since no network access was required for trans-
action, it demanded critically high security level on each Mondex purse itself. Z
Speciﬁcation was used to prove the following security properties of Mondex:
1. no value may be created in the system: the sum of all the purses' balances
does not increase; and
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2. all values must be accounted for in the system: the sum of all purses' balances
and lost components does not change.
The security properties were proved manually, which was evaluated by a third party
group, and a sanitized version of the proof was published in 2000 [13]. The proof
has critically helped Mondex be granted ITSEC security level 6 , the highest level.
In [15], we presented a formal speciﬁcation of Mondex in Sam [16], a formal
software architecture model integrating high-level Petri nets and temporal logic. In
this section, we present a way using model checking to analyze the formal speciﬁ-
cation of Mondex in Sam. This formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation contributes to
the world wide eﬀort on developing a veriﬁed software repository.
2.2 Specifying Mondex in Sam
A formal speciﬁcation of Mondex in Sam was developed in [15]. This section gives
a brief Sam speciﬁcation of the abstract model.
2.2.1 Sam
Sam [16], an architectural description model based on Petri nets and temporal logic,
is well-suited for modeling distributed systems. A Sam speciﬁcation is hierarchical
consisting of multiple compositions. Each composition may contain multiple ele-
ment. Each element C = (B, S) has a behavior model B (modeled in a high level
Petri net [17]), and a property speciﬁcation S (deﬁned by a temporal logic formula).
An element is correctly designed if the behavior model B satisﬁes the property spec-
iﬁcation S, denoted by B |= S. The correctness of a Sam architecture description
is deﬁned recursively from the correctness of all elements.
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A high level Petri net B is a tuple (P, T, F, Spec, ϕ,R,L,M0) where (P, T, F )
is the net structure, Spec is the underlying algebraic speciﬁcation that deﬁnes the
static semantics of net elements, and (ϕ,R,L,M0) is the net inscription that maps
net elements to terms in the algebraic speciﬁcation. ϕ associates each place in P
with a type in Spec. R associates each transition in T with a boolean term in Spec.
M0 is the initial marking which associates each place in P with type respecting
ground terms in Spec. We assume that the reader has some knowledge of Petri nets
and temporal logic, and thus omit their formal deﬁnitions, which can be found in
[16]. In the sequel, we simply use Petri nets to refer to high level Petri nets.
2.2.2 The Abstract Model
In the Z Speciﬁcation of Mondex [14], ether is used to model the communication
channel. Messages between purses could be lost, and also could be read by third
parties as there may be somebody eavesdropping, so ether is designed as lossy and
public, all request messages are initialized in ether . Each purse interacts with card
reader via connector, contact or contactless. Each purse accepts input from card
reader, which could be either an initial request in ether , or the message sent out
by another purse. Each purse produces an output to ether .
Accordingly in the Sam model of Mondex, two places, msg_in and msg_out ,
are used to model the communication channel, shown in Fig. 2.1, in which msg_in
contains tokens for input messages, and msg_out contains tokens for output mes-
sages. All request messages are initialized in msg_in , and each purse accepts input
messages from msg_in . For output messages, each purse sends them to msg_out .
All messages in msg_in comes from ether , and all messages in msg_out goes to
ether .
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Figure 2.1: The Abstract Model
The abstract model has only one atomic operation to transfer balance from
paying purse to receiving purse. It corresponds to transition AbPurseTransfer in
Fig. 2.1. Transition AbIgnore is introduced in Fig. 2.1 to handle invalid messages.
The whole world of abstract purses is modeled using a power set of purses,
AbWorld .
The net inscription for abstract model is given below, which deﬁnes the types
of places, constraints of transitions, and the initial marking. The deﬁnition of arc
labels are omitted since they are self evident in Fig. 2.1.
The Types of Places
The type of msg_in contains information of operations and parameters. An op-
eration can be aNullIn or transfer , and parameters provide transferring details
including the name of from side (paying party), the name of to side (receiving
party), and the value to transfer. The type of msg_in is thus deﬁned as below.
OP ={aNullIn, transfer} (2.1)
ϕ(msg_in) =OP × string × string × N (2.2)
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The type of AbWorld is a power set of purses, in which each purse has 3 ﬁelds,
the ﬁrst ﬁeld deﬁnes the name of each purse, the second one deﬁnes balance and the
third one deﬁnes lost value.
ϕ(AbWorld) = P(string × N× N) (2.3)
The type of msg_out is modeled as aNullOut .
ϕ(msg_out) ={aNullOut} (2.4)
The Constraints of Transitions
The precondition of transition AbIgnore tests that the message msg1 contains op-
eration aNullIn , and its postcondition keeps AbWorld unchanged.
R(AbIgnore) =(msg1[1] = aNullIn) ∧ (A1′ = A1) (2.5)
For transition AbPurseTransfer , its inputs are a message from msg_in denoted
by msg2 and all abstract purses from AbWorld denoted by A2 . R(AbPurseTransfer)
is the constraint for transition AbPurseTransfer , which assures the purse m is the
from side and purse n is the to side, and m is not the same purse as n . It also
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updates the balance in abstract world.
R(AbPurseTransfer) = (msg2 [1] = transfer)∧
∃ (m ∈ A2, n ∈ A2)  (
m[1] = msg2[2] ∧ n[1] = msg2[3] ∧msg2[2] 6= msg2[3]
∧ A2′ = A2 \ {m,n}∪
{(m[1], (m[2]−msg2[4]),m[3]),
(n[1], (n[2] +msg2[4]), n[3])
}
)
(2.6)
The Initial Marking
Any permissible initial marking can be provided. To demonstrate the dynamic
behavior of our speciﬁcation, the following initial marking is used.
M0(msg_in) = {(transfer, 1, 2, 50)}
M0(msg_out) = {}
M0(AbWorld) = {{(P1, 100, 0), (P2, 200, 0), (P3, 150, 0)}}
(2.7)
2.2.3 The Concrete Model of Mondex in Sam
The concrete model deals with the following security issues: (1) a purse could dis-
connect at any time due to power failure; (2) a message could be lost in the ether ,
the communication channel; and (3) messages in the ether are public and could be
read by any purses.
The concrete model follows the protocol shown in Fig. 2.2: The wallet starts
the transfer with the following messages sequence, message req , message val , and
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Figure 2.2: The Protocol in Concrete Model
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Figure 2.3: The Concrete Model
message ack . Message startFrom and startTo come from card reader, that is
triggered by pressing buttons with value to transfer.
Actually state eaFrom and eaTo can be merged into one state: idle , since a
purse cannot stay in both eaFrom and eaTo states.
Fig. 2.3 shows a Petri net model of the concrete purse, in which msg_in is the
input port in Sam model, and msg_out is the output port in Sam model.
There are seven operations that have corresponding transitions in Petri net
above, which are listed in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Operations List
Operation Name Operation Description
startFrom The operation to process the initial message
startFrom for paying purse.
startTo The operation to process the initial message
startTo for payee purse.
req The operation to process message req, requesting
payment from paying purse.
val The operation to process message val,
transferring balance to payee purse.
ack The operation to process message ack, conﬁrming
the paying purse that the transfer is completed.
readExceptionLog The operation to process message
readExceptionLog, reading the exception log
from purse, and putting the output message into
ether.
ExceptionLogClear The operation to process message
exceptionLogClear, to clear the exception logs
in purse which are already in archive.
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Following is the net inscription for the concrete model including types of places,
constraints of transitions. The initial markings and deﬁnitions of arcs are obvious
and thus are omitted.
There is one transition called abort , which does not have a corresponding mes-
sage. Abort is triggered in case the message input is startFrom , startTo or
clearExceptionLog , and the purse state is epv or epa .
Operations interact with ConWorld , which is a power set of concrete purses.
CounterPartyDetails consists of name , value and nextSeqNo .
CPDetails = NAME × N× N
PayDetails contains TransferDetails , fromSeqNo , toSeqNo.
FROM = NAME
TO = NAME
XferDetails = FROM × TO × V ALUE
PayDetails = XferDetails× N× N
The type of msg_in includes operation, parameter and name. Operations are
listed in Table 2.1 above. A parameter can be CounterpartyDetails , or PayDetails ,
for corresponding operations. Name is used to specify which purse to receive the
message.
OP = {startFrom, startTo, readExceptionLog, req, val, ack,
exceptionLogResult, exceptionLogClear, forged}
PARAM = CPDetails× PayDetails
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Therefore, the type of msg_in , is OP ×PARAM ×NAME, deﬁned as follows.
ϕ(msg_in) =OP ×NAME × N× N
× FROM × TO × V ALUE × N× N×NAME
For forged deﬁned in OP , all messages emitted by any operation ignoring an
input message, or emitted by non-authentic purses, could be forged .
The status can be idle , epr , epv , epa . Idle is the one merged from eaFrom
and eaTo in Z Speciﬁcation, the initial state, epr is the state waiting for message
req , epv is the state waiting for message value , and epa is the state waiting for
message ack .
STATUS = {idle, epr, epv, epa}
ConPurse is the concrete purse including ﬁelds: name of purse, balance, excep-
tion log, next sequence number, pay details and status.
ConPurse =NAME × N× PPayDetails× N× PayDetails× STATUS
=NAME × N× PPayDetails× N× FROM × TO × V ALUE
× N× N× STATUS
Message is deﬁned as the same as msg_in .
Message = msg_in
ConWorld is composed of a power set of concrete purses, ether , and archive ,
in which ether is a power set of Message , for public communication channel, and
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archive is LogBook , for persistent storage of exception logs.
LogBook =P(NAME × PayDetails)
=P(NAME × FROM × TO × V ALUE × N× N)
ϕ(ConWorld) =P(ConPurse)× PMessage× LogBook
ϕ(msg_out) =msg_in
As ConWorld involves a power set of ConPurse , and a ConPurse involves a power
set of PayDetails , thus making ConWorld a nested power set. Our tool under
development does not support nested power set for the consideration of simpliﬁng its
implementation, given the fact that there is always an equivalent non-nested power
set. For ConPurse , we can transform it as below to remove power set, thus making
ConWorld a non-nested power set. A ConPurse can have a set of PayDetails as
exception logs, so we use a bool to indicate emptiness of the set of PayDetails . If
the size of the set of PayDetails is greater than 1, we can put another ConPurse
into ConWorld , with diﬀerent PayDetails .
ConPurse =NAME × N× bool × N× FROM × TO × V ALUE
× N× N× STATUS × PayDetails
=NAME × N× bool × N× FROM × TO × V ALUE
× N× N× STATUS × FROM × TO × V ALUE
× N× N
The types of ConPurse and msg_in are summarized in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3
to facilitate understanding. The mapping relation can also be implemented in a tool
for syntax checking against the constraints in the future.
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Table 2.2: Summarization of type ConPurse
Number Type Description
1 NAME Name of purse
2 N Balance
3 bool Emptiness of exception log
4 N Next Sequence Number
5 FROM Name of paying side in
PayDetails
6 TO Name of payee side in PayDetails
7 VALUE Value to transfer in PayDetails
8 N fromSeqNo in PayDetails
9 N toSeqNo in PayDetails
10 STATUS Status
11 FROM Name of paying side in an
exception log
12 TO Name of payee side in an
exception log
13 VALUE Value to transfer in an exception
log
14 N fromSeqNo in an exception log
15 N toSeqNo in an exception log
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Table 2.3: Summarization of type msg_in
Number Type Description
1 OP Operation or message type
2 NAME Name in CounterPartyDetails
3 N Value in CounterPartyDetails
4 N Next Sequence Number in
CounterPartyDetails
5 FROM Name of paying side in
PayDetails
6 TO Name of payee side in PayDetails
7 VALUE Value to transfer in PayDetails
8 N fromSeqNo in PayDetails
9 N toSeqNo in PayDetails
10 NAME Name of destination purse of this
message
The constraint of each transition consists of a precondition and a postcondition.
The precondition deﬁnes the enabling condition of a transition and the postcondition
deﬁnes the ﬁring result of the transition. We only provide a detailed explanation
of the precondition and the postcondition of transition startFrom . For all other
transitions, we just give the formula deﬁning its precondition and postcondition.
Transition startFrom deﬁnes the operation upon receiving startFrom message.
The precondition tests whether there is purse in concrete world meeting the following
conditions:
1. The purse's name matches the name speciﬁed in received message, and does
not equal the counterparty name in message;
2. The balance of the purse is greater than or equal to the value speciﬁed in
startFrom message; and
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3. The purse is in state idle .
The postcondition is as follows:
1. Its new nextSeqNo is greater than the one before ﬁring transition;
2. Payment details are stored, as paying purse name, payee purse name, value to
transfer, paying purse nextSeqNo , payee purse nextSeqNo ;
3. Move to epr state;
4. No output message; and
5. The concrete world is updated with new purse and output message.
R(startFrom) = (msg_from[1] = startFrom)
∧∃(purse ∈ CF [1])  (
(purse[1] = msg_from[10]) ∧ (purse[1] 6= msg_from[2])
∧ (purse[2] ≥ msg_from[3]) ∧ (purse[10] = idle)
∧ (purse′[1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse′[2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse′[3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse′[11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse′[12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse′[13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse′[14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse′[15] = purse[15])
∧ (purse[4] < purse′[4]) ∧ (purse′[5] = purse[1])
∧ (purse′[6] = msg_from[2]) ∧ (purse′[7] = msg_from[3])
∧ (purse′[8] = purse[4]) ∧ (purse′[9] = msg_from[4])
∧ (purse′[10] = epr) ∧ (msg_from′ = (forged))
∧ (CF ′[1] = CF [1] \ purse ∪ purse′)
∧ (CF ′[2] = CF [2] ∪msg_from′) ∧ (CF ′[3] = CF [3])
)
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Transition startTo deﬁnes the operation upon receiving message startTo . The
following formula deﬁnes the precondition and the postcondition of this transition:
R(startTo) = (msg_to[1] = startTo)
∧∃(purse ∈ CT [1])  (
(purse[1] = msg_to[10]) ∧ (purse[1] 6= msg_to[2])
∧ (purse[2] ≥ msg_to[3]) ∧ (purse[10] = idle)
∧ (purse′[1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse′[2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse′[3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse′[11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse′[12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse′[13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse′[14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse′[15] = purse[15])
∧ (purse[4] < purse′[4]) ∧ (purse′[5] = msg_to[2])
∧ (purse′[6] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse′[7] = msg_to[3])
∧ (purse′[8] = purse[4]) ∧ (purse′[9] = msg_to[4])
∧ (purse′[10] = epv) ∧ (msg_to′ = (req,msg_to[2],msg_to[3],
msg_to[4], purse′[5], purse′[6], purse′[7], purse′[8],
purse′[9],msg_to[2]))
∧ (CT ′[1] = CT [1] \ purse ∪ purse′)
∧ (CT ′[2] = CT [2] ∪msg_to′) ∧ (CT ′[3] = CT [3])
)
Transition req is ﬁred upon receiving corresponding message in place msg_in .
Its inputs are a message from msg_in denoted by msg_req and all concrete purses
from ConWorld denoted by CR , its outputs are a message denoted by msg_req'
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to msg_out , and all concrete purses denoted by CR' to send back to ConWorld
with necessary change. The precondition and the postcondition of transition req is
deﬁned by the following formula:
R(req) = (msg_req[1] = req)
∧∃(purse ∈ CR[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg_req[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = epr)
∧ (purse′[1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse′[2] = purse[2]−msg_req[7])
∧ (purse′[3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse′[4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse′[5] = purse[5]) ∧ (purse′[6] = purse[6])
∧ (purse′[7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse′[8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse′[9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse′[10] = epa)
∧ (purse′[11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse′[12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse′[13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse′[14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse′[15] = purse[15])
∧ (msg_req′ = (val,msg_req[2],msg_req[3],
msg_req[4], purse′[5], purse′[6], purse′[7], purse′[8],
purse′[9],msg_req[6]))
∧ (CR′[1] = CR[1] \ purse ∪ purse′)
∧ (CR′[2] = CR[2] ∪msg_req′) ∧ (CR′[3] = CR[3])
)
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Transition val deﬁnes the operation upon receiving message val . The precon-
dition and postcondition of transition val are deﬁned by the following formula:
R(val) = (msg_val[1] = val)
∧∃(purse ∈ CV [1])  (
(purse[1] = msg_val[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = epv)
∧ (purse′[1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse′[2] = purse[2] +msg_val[7])
∧ (purse′[3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse′[4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse′[5] = purse[5]) ∧ (purse′[6] = purse[6])
∧ (purse′[7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse′[8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse′[9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse′[10] = idle)
∧ (purse′[11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse′[12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse′[13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse′[14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse′[15] = purse[15])
∧ (msg_val′ = (ack,msg_val[2],msg_val[3],
msg_val[4], purse′[5], purse′[6], purse′[7], purse′[8],
purse′[9],msg_val[5]))
∧ (CV ′[1] = CV [1] \ purse ∪ purse′)
∧ (CV ′[2] = CV [2] ∪msg_val′) ∧ (CV ′[3] = CV [3])
)
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Transition ack deﬁnes the operation upon receiving message ack . The precon-
dition and the postcondition are deﬁned by the following formula:
R(ack) = (msg_ack[1] = ack)
∧∃(purse ∈ CA[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg_ack[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = epa)
∧ (purse′[1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse′[2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse′[3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse′[4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse′[5] = purse[5]) ∧ (purse′[6] = purse[6])
∧ (purse′[7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse′[8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse′[9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse′[10] = idle)
∧ (purse′[11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse′[12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse′[13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse′[14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse′[15] = purse[15])
∧ (msg_ack′ = (forged))
∧ (CA′[1] = CA[1] \ purse ∪ purse′)
∧ (CA′[2] = CA[2] ∪msg_ack′) ∧ (CA′[3] = CA[3])
)
Transition readExceptionLog deﬁnes the operation upon receiving message
readExceptionLog . The precondition and the postcondition are deﬁned below:
R(readExceptionLog) = (msg_read[1] = readExceptionLog)
∧∃(purse ∈ C1[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg_read[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = idle)
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∧ ((purse[3] = true) ∧ (msg_read′ =
(exceptionLogResult,msg_read[2],msg_read[3],
msg_read[4], purse[11], purse[12], purse[13],
purse[14], purse[15],msg_read[10]))
∨ (purse[3] = false ∧msg_read′ = (forged))
)
∧ (C1′[1] = C1[1]) ∧ (C1′[3] = C1[3])
∧ (C1′[2] = C1[2] ∪msg_read′)
)
Transition clearExceptionLog deﬁnes the operation upon receiving message
clearExceptionLog . The precondition and the postcondition are deﬁned below:
R(clearExceptionLog) = (msg_clr[1] = clearExceptionLog)
∧∃(purse ∈ C2[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg_clr[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = idle)
∧ (purse[3] = true) ∧ (msg_clr′ = (forged))
∧ (purse′[1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse′[2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse′[3] = false) ∧ (purse′[4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse′[5] = purse[5]) ∧ (purse′[6] = purse[6])
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∧ (purse′[7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse′[8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse′[9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse′[10] = purse[10])
∧ (C2′[1] = C2[1] \ purse ∪ purse′)
∧ (C2′[2] = C2[2] ∪msg_clr′) ∧ (C2′[3] = C2[3])
)
Transition Abort deﬁnes the operation to deal with exception. The precondition
and the postcondition are deﬁned by the following formula:
R(Abort) = ((msg_abort[1] = startFrom) ∨ (msg_abort[1] = startTo)
∨ (msg_abort[1] = clearExceptionLog))
∧∃(purse ∈ C3[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg_abort[10])
∧ ((purse[10] = epv) ∨ (purse[10] = epa))
∧ (purse′[1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse′[2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse′[4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse′[5] ≥ purse[5]) ∧ (purse′[6] = purse[6])
∧ (purse′[7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse′[8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse′[9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse′[10] = idle)
∧ (purse′[3] = true) ∧ (purse′[11] = purse[5])
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∧ (purse′[12] = purse[6]) ∧ (purse′[13] = purse[7])
∧ (purse′[14] = purse[8]) ∧ (purse′[15] = purse[9])
∧ (C3′[1] = C3[1] ∪ purse′)
∧ (C3′[2] = C3[2]) ∧ (C3′[3] = C3[3])
)
The deﬁnitions of arcs are self evident from Fig. 2.3.
2.3 Analyzing the Speciﬁcation in Sam
Model checking is an automatic and eﬀective method for analyzing ﬁnite state sys-
tems, which is well suited for this Sam speciﬁcation. In Sam, model checking is
to ensure B |= S, that is the behavior model B satisﬁes the property speciﬁcation
S. The behavior model B uses high level Petri net, which employs sets and power
sets as the type of places. The property speciﬁcation S uses linear temporal logic.
Spin uses Promela as its input language to model the behavior, and uses linear
temporal logic to specify the properties. In order to use Spin for model checking
Sam speciﬁcation, the behavior model B is translated to Promela code, and the
property speciﬁcation S remains the same. Translation between formal models are
often useful, various issues with regard to formal model translation were discussed
in [18].
2.3.1 Spin and Promela
Spin [19] is a well known model checking tool used in the veriﬁcation of ﬁnite state
systems. Promela, as the input language of Spin, consists of processes, channels,
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and variables. For the channels, there are operations to fetch messages from them
randomly or ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-out, and to fetch the messages with desired ﬁeld value. It is
also possible to test the existence of desired messages in channels while not changing
anything.
Speciﬁcally, single question mark "?" is a Promela operator that returns the
ﬁrst message in the channel, double question mark "??" is a Promela operator
that returns the ﬁrst matched message in the channel, "[...]" is a Promela testing
operator returning true or false, while does not block the execution and does not
copy messages in the channel, and "<...>" is a Promela channel poll operator
which copys a message without removing it from the channel if a desired message
exists in the channel. There is a predeﬁned unary function in Promela called eval
to turn an expression into a value. "!" is a Promela operator that sends a message
to the channel.
2.3.2 Rules to Translate High Level Petri Net to Promela
This section introduces the rules to translate a high level Petri net to Promela,
with the abstract model of Mondex (Fig. 2.1) as the example, however, the rules
are also applied to the concrete model of Mondex for model checking discussed in
Section 2.4. Before discussing the details of rules, we outline the translation by
explaining the mapping from a high level Petri net to Promela code, as shown in
Table 2.4.
Without the loss of generality, we assume all the types in a Petri net model are
directly deﬁnable in Promela in this section, since we can always make a type
conversion before the translation.
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Table 2.4: Outline of mapping relationships from Petri Nets to Promela
Petri Nets Description
Places Places contain tokens,while in Promela channel
contains messages, thus places are translated into
channels.
Transitions Each transition is translated into a Promela
inline function.
Transition constraints The contraints for each transition have 2 parts:
precondition and postcondition.
Initial markings The initial marking is translated to initial
messages in the channel.
2.3.2.1 Step 1. Deﬁne places as channels
Each place is translated into a Promela channel; and tokens are translated into
messages. Speciﬁcally, let p ∈ P be a place in Petri net with type ϕ(p) = s1, s2, ..., sn,
we deﬁne a bounded channel in Promela as follows.
#define Bound_p const
chan type_p = [Bound_p] of {s1, s2, ..., sn};
where const is a user deﬁned positive integer value. Line 5 in Section 2.5 is a
translation example of place AbWorld in Fig. 2.1 with type deﬁned in Formula 2.3.
2.3.2.2 Step 2. Deﬁne the inline functions for the precondition of a
transition
The inline function works like usual preprocessor macro. It is introduced here to
oﬀer better translation structure and facilitate automated translation.
Formally, for each transition t ∈ T with constraint:
R(t) = PreCond(t) ∧ PostCond(t) (2.8)
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where PreCond(t) is the precondition of transition t and PostCond(t) is the post-
condition of transition t. R(t) contains basic relational expression connected through
logical conjunction ∧ or logical disjunction ∨, in which PreCond(t) contains only
variables on input arcs and PostCond(t) contains variables on output arcs with or
without variables on input arcs. Let v ∈ L(p, t) denote a simple variable in case v
does not have a power set type. Let v ∈ S, S ∈ L(p, t), S has a power set type, v
denotes a quantiﬁed variable. We assume the ﬁrst ﬁeld of either simple variables or
quantiﬁed variables be the key ﬁeld, and for those variables v containing only one
ﬁeld, each reference of v is viewed as v[1].
We use the constraint (Formula 2.6) of transition AbPurseTransfer as an ex-
ample in this section, in which the part above the line is the precondition and the
part below the line is the postcondition.
We deﬁne an inline function to check the enabledness of the precondition of each
transition. First, we deﬁne a boolean variable t_is_enabled to store the truth
value of the checking for transition t , with initialized value false, refer to Step 5
below. Second, for the ﬁelds of each simple variable or quantiﬁed variable, we deﬁne
corresponding variables. Let v be the name of simple variable or quantiﬁed variable
containing n ﬁelds, TY PE(i) be the type of ith ﬁeld, we deﬁne TY PE(i) v_fieldi;
for i ∈ 2..n. For example, we deﬁne Line 29-30 in Appedix 2.5 for Formula 2.6.
Table 2.5 gives the general mapping for basic relational expression connected
through logical conjunction ∧ or logical disjunction ∨. We use single question mark
for simple variables such that messages in the channel are retrieved in FIFO order,
and we use double question mark for quantiﬁed variables since existential quantiﬁ-
cation implies a search throughout the whole power set. We use "<...>" to make a
guard statement for if statement in Promela, so that only in case there is a desired
message the statements following guard statement are executed and the matched
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Table 2.5: General Mapping from basic relational expressions in the precondition of
each transition in a Petri Net to Promela Expressions
Basic Relational Expression Promela Expressions
v[1] = Exp
where v ∈ L(p, t) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T and v is
a simple variable containing n ﬁelds, Exp
does not contain any ﬁrst ﬁeld.
type_p ? <eval(Exp),
v_field2, v_field3, ..., v_fieldn>
∃(v ∈ S)  (v[1] = Exp)
where v ∈ S, S ∈ L(p, t) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T
and v is a quantiﬁed variable containing
n ﬁelds, Exp does not contain the ﬁrst
ﬁeld of any quantiﬁed variable.
type_p ?? [eval(Exp),
v_field2, v_field3, ..., v_fieldn]
Table 2.6: Mapping from the precondition in Formula 2.6 to Promela Expressions
Basic Relational Expression Promela Expressions
msg2[1] = transfer type_msg_in? < eval(transfer),msg2_field2,
msg2_field3,msg2_field4 >
m[1] = msg2[2] type_AbWorld??[eval(msg2_field2),m_field2,
m_field3]
n[1] = msg2[3] type_AbWorld??[eval(msg2_field3), n_field2,
n_field3]
msg2[2] 6= msg2[3] msg2_field2 ! = msg2_field3
message is copied, for example, in Section 2.5, Line 31 is a guard statement for Line
60, where the matched message is copied to msg2_ﬁeld2 to msg2_ﬁeld4 for each
ﬁeld; and we use "[...]" to test the existence of messages in case a truth value is
needed for if statement and the matched message does not require a copy.
Table 2.6 gives the mapping for the precondition in Formula 2.6.
Line 26-37 in Section 2.5 is the resulted Promela code.
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Table 2.7: General Mapping from basic relational expressions in the postcondition
of each transition in a Petri Net to Promela Expressions
Basic Relational Expression Promela Expressions
v[1] = Exp
where v ∈ L(p, t) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T , and v is a simple
variable containing n ﬁelds.
type_p ? eval(Exp),
v_field2, v_field3, ...,
v_fieldn
S ′ = S\{v}
where
v ∈ S, S ∈ L(p, t) , S ′ ∈ L(t, p) p ∈ P, t ∈ T , and
v is a quantiﬁed variable containing n ﬁelds,
v[1] = Expression is a part of the precondition.
type_p ?? eval(Exp),
v_field2, v_field3, ...,
v_fieldn
v′ = Exp
where v′ ∈ L(t, p) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T .
type_p ! Exp
S ′ = S ∪ {(Exp1, Exp2, ..., Expn)}
where S ∈ L(p, t), S ′ ∈ L(t, p) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T .
type_p ! Exp1, Exp2, ..., Expn
2.3.2.3 Step 3. Deﬁne the inline function for the postcondition of a
transition
For each transition, once its precondition is met, it can ﬁre. This section introduces
the rules to deﬁne an inline function for the postcondition of a transition ﬁring.
In the rules for the precondition, we test enabledness without moving any tokens,
thus as part of the postcondition we move tokens through input arcs. For a simple
variable v on an input arc a message from the head of channel obtained from place
p is retrieved, according to the constraint v[1] = Exp in the precondition. For
a simple variable v′ on an output arc, a message is sent to the channel obtained
from place p. For a quantiﬁed variable v ∈ S, if S ′ = S\{v} is a part of the
postcondition, a message is retrieved by searching throughout the channel obtained
from place p, according to the constraint v[1] = Exp in the precondition. Besides the
cases above, we need to deal with ∪{(Exp1, Exp2, ..., Expn)} in case S ′ = S\{v} ∪
{(Exp1, Exp2, ..., Expn)}is a part of the postcondition, by sending a message to the
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Table 2.8: Mapping from the postcondition in Formula 2.6 to Promela Expressions
Basic Relational Expression Promela Code
msg2[1] = transfer type_msg_in?eval(transfer),msg2_field2,
msg2_field3,msg2_field4
A2′ = A2\{m} type_AbWorld??eval(msg2_field2),m_field2,
m_field3;
\{n} type_AbWorld??eval(msg2_field3), n_field2,
n_field3;
∪{(m[1], (m[2]−
msg2[4]),m[3])}
type_AbWorld!msg2_field2,m_field2−
msg2_field4,m_field3;
∪{(n[1], (n[2] +
msg2[4]), n[3])}
type_AbWorld!msg2_field3,n_field2 +
msg2_field4, n_field3;
channel obtained from place p, using the values of (Exp1, Exp2, ..., Expn). Table 2.7
gives the general mapping. After ﬁring the transition, t_is_enabled is set to false.
Table 2.8 gives the mapping for the postcondition in Formula 2.6, in which
m[1] is replaced with msg2_field2 and n[1] is replaced with msg2_field3 as the
precondition since we do not declare variables in Promela for the ﬁrst ﬁeld of each
simple variable or quantiﬁed variable.
Line 38-47 in Section 2.5 is the resulted Promela code.
2.3.2.4 Step 4. Deﬁne an inline function for each transition
Each transition has its precondition and postcondition, we deﬁne an inline function
for each transition t ∈ T using the inline functions for its precondition and postcon-
dition. Firing transition is deﬁned as atomic operations using Promela keyword
atomic .
inline t()
{
is_enabled_t (); /*Set t_is_enabled to true/false*/
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if
:: t_is_enabled -> atomic{fire_t ()}
:: else -> skip
fi
}
For example, Line 48-54 in Section 2.5 is the inline function for transition
AbPurseTransfer in Fig. 2.1.
2.3.2.5 Step 5. Deﬁne a process for the whole net
The dynamic semantics of a Petri net is to non-deterministically ﬁre enabled transi-
tions. We deﬁne the following Promela process with a loop to capture the dynamic
semantics of a Petri net.
proctype ModelName (){
bool t1_is_enabled = false;
bool t2_is_enabled = false; ...
bool tn_is_enabled = false;
do
::t1()
::t2() ...
::tn()
od
}
where T = {t1, t2, ...tn}. For example, we deﬁne a process as Line 55-62 in Section
2.5, for abstract model of Mondex in Fig. 2.1.
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2.3.2.6 Step 6. Deﬁne the initial marking and run the processes
Let P = {p1, ..., pn}, for each place p ∈ P , with initial markingM0(p) = {m1,m2, ...,
mk}. We deﬁne sort_p ! mi for each i, i ∈ 1..k and run the process ModelName
deﬁned in the steps above.
init {
type_p1!m1;... type_p1!mk1;
...
type_pn!m1;... type_pn!mkn;
run ModelName ()
}
For example, we deﬁne Line 63-67 in Section 2.5 for abstract model of Mondex
in Fig. 2.1, according to Formula 2.7.
2.3.3 Translation Correctness
Katz et al. [18] proposed a framework for translating models and speciﬁcations,
in which atomicity of transitions and variables with unspeciﬁed next values were
discussed as issues in translation. In our work, we use the atomic keyword in
Promela to make the transition atomic, and we use temporal logic to specify the
postcondition for each variable.
We introduce the deﬁnitions of completeness and consistency before deﬁning
translation correctness. Completeness ensures that each place, transition and initial
marking has its representation in Promela code.
Deﬁnition 1. Translation Completeness: Each entity in a Petri net is mapped to
a language construct in Promela.
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Lemma 1. Given a Petri net N , there exists a Promela program PN representing
N .
Proof. The rules in Section 2.3.2 cover the translation from N to PN .
Consistency ensures that the Promela code preserves the semantics of a Petri
net. While there are several well known semantic models of Petri nets, we adopt the
interleaving semantics, which is adequate for studying the system properties deﬁned
in temporal logic.
Deﬁnition 2. Translation Consistency: The dynamic behaviour of a Petri net
is preserved in Promela code. The interleaved execution is a sequence σ =
M0toM1t1...tn−1Mn, where n > 0, Mi(i ∈ N ∧ 0 6 i 6 n) is a marking and
ti(i ∈ N ∧ 0 6 i 6 n) is a transition ﬁring. Promela code execution is σ′ =
S0Run(pt0)S1Run(pt1)...Run(ptn−1)Sn, where Si(i ∈ N ∧ 0 6 i 6 n) is a snapshot
of values in variables deﬁned in Promela code, and Run(pti)(i ∈ N ∧ 0 6 i 6 n)
denotes the execution of inline function pti translated from ti as the rules in Section
2.3.2.
Lemma 2. (Initial Marking Consistency) The initial marking of a Petri net N is
consistent with the initial values of variables in translated Promela PN .
Proof. According to Step 1 in Section 2.3.2, marked places are translated into chan-
nels, and Step 6 in Section 2.3.2, the initial marking is used to initialize the channel
variables. The initial marking of a Petri net N is M0, and S0 is the snapshot of ini-
tial values of variables in translated Promela PN . According to Step 6 in Section
2.3.2, S0 is mapped from M0.
Lemma 3. (Semantic Consistency) PN bisimulates N .
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Proof. Let σ be an execution of N , we proof PN simulates N by induction on the
length of sequence n.
Base case, n = 0. It is the initial marking consistency proved above.
Suppose it is true for n = k that the claim holds, that is, σ = M0toM1t1...tk−1Mk
is consistent with σ′ = S0Run(pt0)S1Run(pt1)...Run(ptk−1)Sk.
If n = k + 1, as the Step 2 in Section 2.3.2, the precondition of ptk is the
mapping of precondition of tk; as the Step 3 in Section 2.3.2, the postcondition of
ptk is the mapping of postcondition of tk, that is, Sk+1 is the mapping of Mk+1;
as the Step 4 in Section 2.3.2, Run(ptk) generates Sk+1, which denotes marking
Mk+1 obtained from ﬁring tk. So, σk+1 = M0toM1t1...tkMk+1 is consistent with
σ′k+1 = S0Run(pt0)S1Run(pt1)...Run(ptk)Sk+1.
The reverse direction is proved in the same way, hence, PN bisimulates N .
Deﬁnition 3. Translation Correctness: Translation correctness consists of transla-
tion completeness and translation consistency.
Theorem 1. Given a Petri net N , the Promela program PN obtained from the
translation rules in Section 2.3.2 preserves the semantics of N .
Proof. We prove the translation correctness by proving translation completeness
and consistency. It is straightforward from Lemma 1 to 3.
2.3.4 Analysis Result
There are two security properties to verify for Mondex [14], the details of these
properties are listed in Table 2.9.
We use the model checker Spin to verify the properties in exhaustive mode. Here
are the LTL properties we used in Spin to do veriﬁcation, in which bal_sum =∑
a∈A,A∈AbWorld a[2] is the sum of balances, lost_sum =
∑
a∈A,A∈AbWorld a[3] is the
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Table 2.9: The Properties of Mondex to Verify
Property Name Property Description
All Value Accounted all value must be accounted for in the system: the sum of
all purses' balances and lost components does not change.
No Value Created no value may be created in the system: the sum of all the
purses' balances does not increase.
sum of lost amounts, and 450 is exactly the sum of bal_sum and lost_sum in all
initial marking.
 bal_sum+ lost_sum = 450 (2.9)
 bal_sum 6 450 (2.10)
The veriﬁcation result is that all these LTL properties are satisﬁed with given
initial marking.
2.4 Related Works
Several research groups around the world have tackled this 1st pilot project in
recent years. In [20], Z/Eves was used to mechanize the original speciﬁcation of
Mondex in Z [14], which took about eight weeks to complete the mechanization of
the entire speciﬁcation, reﬁnement and its proof. In [21], Alloy was used to specify
Mondex and Alloy Analyzer was used to check the speciﬁcation that resulted in the
discovery of several bugs. The speciﬁcation and analysis took about 6 months for a
research internship to ﬁnish. [22] used the KIV to specify and verify Mondex using
a single reﬁnement, which took about one person month. [23] presented an Event-B
speciﬁcation of Mondex using B4free, which consists of 10 levels, an abstract model
and 9 levels of reﬁnement. The development took approximately 2 weeks of total
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eﬀort spread over several months. In [24], RAISE was used to specify Mondex. The
speciﬁcation consists of three levels: abstract, intermediate, and concrete. Half of
the proofs were done automatically.
Other works on Mondex mainly focus on the automation of the proof of Mondex,
while [24] not only made eﬀort on proof of Mondex, but also did some model checking
with limits such that there are only 2 purses in the world, and money is in the range
0 to 3, to reduce states as much as possible. Our approach using model checking
oﬀers great scalability to verify the properties of Mondex.
Regarding the translation from Petri net to Promela, this section oﬀers a
unique way to translate high level Petri net to Promela. [25] provides an ap-
proach to translate Sam to Promela in which the embedded C code was used as
the main approach, while we do not use embedded C code. [26] had the similar idea
to ours on translation rules from Petri net to Promela, but it only dealt with low
level Petri nets, while we propose an approach to translating high level Petri nets
to Promela codes.
2.5 A Promela program translated from Abstract Model of
Mondex
1 #define BOUND_msg_in 10
2 #define BOUND_AbWorld 10
3 #define BOUND_msg_out 10
4 chan type_AbWorld =[ BOUND_AbWorld] of {short , int , int};
5 mtype = {aNullIn , transfer };
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6 chan type_msg_in = [BOUND_msg_in] of {mtype , short , short
, int};
7 mtype = {aNullOut };
8 chan type_msg_out = [BOUND_msg_out] of {mtype};
9 int bal_sum = 450, lost_sum = 0,seed = 0,last_seed = 0;
10 inline is_enabled_AbIgnore () {
11 short msg1_field2;short msg1_field3;int msg1_field4;
12 type_msg_in?<aNullIn ,msg1_field2 , msg1_field3 ,
msg1_field4 > ->
13 AbIgnore_is_enabled = true
14 }
15 inline fire_AbIgnore (){
16 type_msg_in?aNullIn ,msg1_field2 , msg1_field3 ,
msg1_field4;
17 AbIgnore_is_enabled = false
18 }
19 inline AbIgnore (){
20 is_enabled_AbIgnore ();
21 if
22 :: AbIgnore_is_enabled -> atomic{fire_AbIgnore ()}
23 :: else -> skip
24 fi
25 }
26 inline is_enabled_AbPurseTransfer (){
27 short msg2_field2 , msg2_field3;int msg2_field4;
28 int m_field2 , m_field3 , n_field2 , n_field3;
41
29 type_msg_in?<transfer ,msg2_field2 , msg2_field3 ,
msg2_field4 >;
30 if
31 :: msg2_field2 != msg2_field3 &&
32 type_AbWorld ??[ eval(msg2_field2), m_field2 , m_field3]
&&
33 type_AbWorld ??[ eval(msg2_field3), n_field2 , n_field3]
->
34 AbPurseTransfer_is_enabled = true
35 :: else -> skip
36 fi
37 }
38 inline fire_AbPurseTransfer () {
39 type_msg_in?transfer ,msg2_field2 , msg2_field3 ,
msg2_field4;
40 type_AbWorld ??eval(msg2_field2), m_field2 , m_field3;
41 type_AbWorld ??eval(msg2_field3), n_field2 , n_field3;
42 atomic{type_AbWorld!msg2_field2 , m_field2 - msg2_field4
, m_field3;
43 bal_sum = bal_sum - msg2_field4 ;}
44 atomic{type_AbWorld!msg2_field3 , n_field2 + msg2_field4
, n_field3;
45 bal_sum = bal_sum + msg2_field4 ;}
46 AbPurseTransfer_is_enabled = false
47 }
48 inline AbPurseTransfer () {
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49 is_enabled_AbPurseTransfer ();
50 if
51 :: AbPurseTransfer_is_enabled -> atomic{
fire_AbPurseTransfer ()}
52 :: else -> skip
53 fi
54 }
55 proctype AbstractMondex (){
56 bool AbIgnore_is_enabled = false;
57 bool AbPurseTransfer_is_enabled = false;
58 do
59 :: AbIgnore ()
60 :: AbPurseTransfer ()
61 od
62 }
63 init {
64 type_msg_in!transfer ,1,2,50; type_AbWorld !1 ,100,0;
65 type_AbWorld !2 ,200,0; type_AbWorld !3,150 ,0;
66 run AbstractMondex ()
67 }
2.6 Summary
We provide a way of using model checking to verify the formal speciﬁcation of
Mondex in Sam [15], including the abstract model and concrete model. this section
is presented with the abstract model as an example.
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Eﬀort
It took us two person months to complete the speciﬁcation[15], and 80 person-hours
to translate the Sam model into Promela code for Mondex concrete model and to
verify the model automatically using Spin.
Bugs found
[21] found three bugs in the Z speciﬁcation, in which one bug is for missing con-
straints about authenticity, also found by KIV method [22], two bugs are related
with reasoning errors during reﬁnement. For the authenticity bug, Z speciﬁcation
gives no constraints for authenticity so that a purse could be making a transaction
with a non-authentic purse. For example, a purse is in epv status, which is to purse,
waiting for val message, there should be constraints preventing this purse from re-
ceiving req message as from purse. Similarly there should also be constraints
preventing the purse in epa status as from purse from receiving val message as to
purse. Without these constraints for authenticity, the actual role of purse could be
inconsistent in the transaction. The other two bugs are both for reasoning errors
during reﬁnement which is not present in this section as we using model checking
do not do that reﬁnement. Our speciﬁcation avoids the authenticity bug through
adding proper constraints and does not have reﬁnement bugs.
Scalability
We conducted the model checking of Mondex concrete model with a Windows based
PC which has 1.8Ghz CPU and 2GB memory. Since the Mondex system is not
a network system and only contains atomic operations involving two purses; it is
adequate to model and analyze the system with one randomly chosen initial message.
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Figure 2.4: Scalability of Model Checking on Mondex
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Therefore, we created a random message in the initial markings, the range for value
of money was 0 . . . 231−1. We conducted an experiment by increasing the number of
purses in the initial markings, to show the scalability of memory usage, cpu timing
and allocated state vector, as the Fig. 2.4 below.
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CHAPTER 3
A METHOD TO MINE TRACES FOR BUILDING PETRI NETS TO
AID DESIGNING SCIENTIFIC WORKFLOWS
In this chapter, we develop methods to mine traces to build Petri nets automat-
ically to aid designing scientiﬁc workﬂows.
3.1 Using Existing Process Mining Algorithms
This section presents existing process mining algorithms using scientiﬁc workﬂows as
examples. Section 3.1.1 presents a method using process mining based on provenance
to create and analyze scientiﬁc workﬂows. Figure 3.1 shows a high level view of the
context to mine provenance. Applying process mining in the context of scientiﬁc
workﬂow needs to address the following issues. In this section we focus on control
ﬂow mining, and discuss the other two issues in Section 3.1.4.
1. Control ﬂow mining: To mine control ﬂows from provenance, we need to ex-
tract information and to present it in the format acceptable to existing process
mining tools. We also need to select appropriate process discovery algorithms
depending on the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows.
2. Data dependency: Data dependency contained in provenance can contribute
to process mining for improving the mining results. It is critical to enhance
the existing control ﬂow based process mining algorithms with data ﬂow ca-
pabilities.
3. Incremental mining: Given a scientiﬁc workﬂow template [27], scientists need
to ﬁne-tune it many times, which makes updating large scientiﬁc workﬂows
a challenge for scientists. Mining from scratch is neither eﬃcient for large
scale scientiﬁc workﬂows nor eﬀective to address existing scientiﬁc workﬂow
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Figure 3.1: Mining provenance
templates. Incremental mining can utilize the information in existing scientiﬁc
workﬂow templates to make mining more eﬃcient and eﬀective.
Section 3.1.2 presents a method to convert provenance to XES format that is ac-
cepted by existing process mining tools, and provides a method using process mining
to create and analyze scientiﬁc workﬂows. Section 3.1.3 contains a brief discussion
of related works. Section 3.1.4 discusses our research direction for using process
mining to address speciﬁc issues in the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows.
3.1.1 Overview
Provenance, in scientiﬁc workﬂow community, refers to the sources of information,
including entities and processes, involved in producing or delivering an artifact.
More speciﬁcally, provenance is captured at four levels [28]. First, the process
level captures information about the invoked processes, their inputs/outputs and
start/end times. Second, the data level, inferred from the process level, provides
derivation paths of intermediate and ﬁnal products. Third, the organization level
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stores the metadata for the experiments. Fourth, the knowledge level connects the
scientiﬁc experiments' discovery with other provenance levels as supporting evidence.
The stored information is used to infer the provenance of intermediate and ﬁnal
results and to verify the quality of the data through tracing the processing steps.
Recent eﬀorts from the scientiﬁc workﬂow community aiming at large-scale cap-
turing of provenance present a new opportunity for building scientiﬁc workﬂow using
provenance. Several researchers [29] have investigated how to synthesize a process
model from event logs. The research area of process mining focuses on extract-
ing information about processes by examining event logs. Practical experience has
shown that typical information recorded in event logs includes information about
which activities are performed, at what time, by whom and in the context of which
case (i.e., process instance). By explicitly using the case context, process discovery
algorithms are capable of constructing process models that accurately describe the
process [29]. Since both event logs and provenance contain process information, a
given scientiﬁc workﬂow may be executed multiple times [30] thus creating multiple
workﬂow execution instances. Scientiﬁc experiments are exploratory in nature thus
change are the norm. As a result, mining processes from scientiﬁc workﬂows is highly
valuable. Provenance does not record control ﬂows associated no data ﬂows, we are
interested in building scientiﬁc workﬂows by combining data ﬂows from provenance
and control ﬂows mined from provenance. Our work provides a new direction in
using captured provenance.
3.1.1.1 Process Mining and XES format of ProM tool
The goal of process mining, or more speciﬁcally control ﬂow discovery is to extract
information about processes from event logs, such that the control ﬂow of a process
is captured in a process model. In process mining an activity refers to an atomic
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part of a process, which may be executed over any length of time and by anyone.
We refer to a case (also a process instance) as the execution trace of a process. The
starting point for control ﬂow discovery is an event log that contains events such
that:
1. Each event refers to an activity (i.e., a well-deﬁned step in the process),
2. Each event refers to a case (i.e., a process instance) and
3. Events are totally ordered (for example by a timestamp).
The (Pro)cess (M)ining framework ProM [31] has been developed as a generic open-
source framework where various process mining algorithms have been implemented.
Currently, over 280 plug-ins have been added. The framework provides researchers
an extensive base to implement new algorithms in the form of plug-ins. The frame-
work provides easy to use user interface functionality, a variety of model type imple-
mentations (e.g. Petri nets) and common functionality like reading and writing ﬁles.
In most cases the starting input is an event log. ProM can read event logs stored in
the formats MXML [32] and from Version 6 also in the new event log format XES
[33]. For more information on process mining and the ProM framework, we refer to
the website www.processmining.org.
XES is an open standard for storing and managing event log data. Its objective
is to provide a generic framework onto which all event log meta-models found in
practice can be mapped with relative ease, without assuming a speciﬁc ﬁeld of
application, or any purpose of the event logs whatsoever. The XES meta-model
recognizes and treats all extensions as equal, independent from their source or level
of proliferation. This allows users to extend it at will to ﬁt any purpose or domain
setting, and thus makes XES a ﬂexible format for all applications. Due to the
ﬂexible handling of extensions, and the attributes deﬁned by those, the XES meta-
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model allows using applications to interpret also previously unknown information.
To provide universally understood semantics, a number of extensions have been
standardized, and thus equipped with a ﬁxed semantics. The currently standardized
extensions include concept extension, lifecycle extension, organizational extension,
time extension, semantic extension and classiﬁcation extension.
3.1.2 A Method to Build Scientiﬁc Workﬂows from Prove-
nance
Figure 3.1 shows a high level view of the context to mine provenance, to build and
update scientiﬁc workﬂows. This section uses provenance generated from scientiﬁc
workﬂow management systems, thus results of the method in this section can be
compared with existing scientiﬁc workﬂows. Note that the method can be applied
to provenance from both sources in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2 shows a high level view
of the method presented and evaluated in this section.
3.1.2.1 Converting Provenance to XES format
XESame [33] is a tool to extract event logs from a data source. The conversion
consists of two steps: conversion deﬁnition and execution. Conversion deﬁnition
speciﬁes a mapping, to map concepts of the data source onto concepts of the event
log. Conversion execution produces event logs as speciﬁed in the mapping. In this
section, we use XESame to convert provenance to event logs as the input for process
mining tool ProM.
In conversion deﬁnition, the most important extension is the concept extension
that includes instances and names. Providing names for each event is desired as
it is very informative. Names of events are the names of the executed activity
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the method
represented by the event. Instances represent identiﬁers of the activity instances
whose executions have generated the events. Another important extension is the
time extension. Time extension speciﬁes a timestamp attribute for events, which
enables events to be ordered to infer control dependency, and enables performance
analysis. For example, using Taverna provenance system, shown in Figure 3.3, we
join two tables PROCESSORENACTMENT and PROCESSOR on their PROCES-
SORID, PROCESSORENACTMENT provides event identiﬁers and corresponding
start time while PROCESSOR provides a event name for each event identiﬁer. Since
we need steps in scientiﬁc workﬂow and corresponding start time, we set instance
as PROCESSORID, name as PROCESSORNAME, and timestamp as ENACT-
MENTSTARTED.
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Figure 3.3: Conﬁguration of XESame
3.1.2.2 Building Scientiﬁc Workﬂows through Process Discovery
The Running Example We adopt the challenge workﬂow from the third Prove-
nance Challenge as an example (http://www.myexperiment.org/workﬂows/750), which
contains both control ﬂow and data ﬂow. While there are several teams implemented
the challenge workﬂow, we choose Taverna as it is connected well to the open scien-
tiﬁc workﬂow repository myExperiment. Provenance provided by Taverna records
the tasks executed and its timestamp, together with data links between tasks. As
the ongoing research work [7] and [34], the provenance in the near future will be
applicable to non-workﬂow systems that enable provenance to record tasks users per-
form in their familiar environment, so that the methods investigated in this section
are able to build scientiﬁc workﬂows automatically.
Using the Fuzzy Miner The fuzzy miner [35] assumes that problems in mining
large scale processes are caused by mismatch between fundamental assumptions of
traditional process mining, and the characteristics of real-life processes. Fuzzy miner
developed an adaptive simpliﬁcation and visualization technique for process models,
which is based on two metrics, signiﬁcance and correlation. The two metrics are
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similar to the concept of data clustering domain where a binary distance metric is
inferred to ﬁnd related subsets of attributes. In the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows,
signiﬁcance, which can be determined both for tasks and precedence relations over
them, measures the relative importance of behavior. As such, it speciﬁes the level of
interest we have in tasks and their control dependency. Correlation is only relevant
for precedence relations over tasks, which measures how closely related two events
following one another is.
As scientiﬁc workﬂows are usually quickly evolving, change can be made to the
example workﬂow several times, including the activities and data. Using the fuzzy
miner, a workﬂow can be mined to provide an abstract view of what does not change,
which oﬀers insight of evolving workﬂows. For the running example, we run it for
10 times, then remove ReadCSVReadyFile and run it for 10 times again, after that
we undo removing ReadCSVReadyFile, remove IsMatchCSVFileTables and run it
for 10 times. Using XESame provenance can be transformed to a XES ﬁle, based on
which the fuzzy miner can be applied. Figure 3.4 shows a resulting model in which
there is every task but IsMatchCSVFileTables, when signiﬁcance cutoﬀ is increased
to 0.392, as Figure 3.5, ReadCSVReadyFile disappeared so that the unchanged part
is shown, which can be the key part of the whole workﬂow. What's more, by double
clicking Cluster 14 that contains 2 elements, the tasks with low signiﬁcance are
shown, which in our context is the changing tasks. As Figure 3.6 shows, there is a
process model related with low signiﬁcance tasks, which exactly matches the original
workﬂow model in the running example. Therefore, in case there is provenance from
either workﬂow based systems or non-workﬂow systems that include tasks scientists
perform, a scientiﬁc workﬂow can be built automatically at diﬀerent abstract level
by using the fuzzy miner.
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Figure 3.4: Fuzzy Mining Result - 1
Figure 3.5: Fuzzy Mining Result - 2
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Figure 3.6: Fuzzy Mining Result - 3
Using the Alpha Miner The alpha miner assumes the completeness of direct
succession (DS) such that if two transitions can follow each other directly, then this
has occurred at least once in the log, yet it may not be the case in reality, the alpha
miner allow users to edit log relations manually to oﬀer more information about di-
rect succession, as shown in Figure 3.7. For large amount of events, manually adding
log relations can be impossible. In scientiﬁc workﬂows context, provenance contains
data dependencies that imply direct succession in time order, data dependencies can
somehow be considered in the alpha miner thus making it closer to completeness of
direct succession. We discuss further about data dependencies in Section 3.1.4.
Using the Genetic Miner The genetic miner is a control-ﬂow process min-
ing algorithm that can discover all the common control-ﬂow structures (i.e. se-
quences, choices, parallelism, loops and non-free-choices, invisible tasks and du-
plicate tasks) while being robust to noisy logs. The genetic miner has more dif-
ﬁculties to mine models with constructs that allow for many interleaving situa-
tions. Figure 3.8 shows the result of the genetic miner on the running exam-
55
Figure 3.7: Alpha Mining Result
ple. Genetic miner successfully get a non-free-choices construct such as both Is-
MatchTableRowCount and IsMatchTableColumnRanges depend on UpdateCom-
putedColumns while IsMatchTableRowCount depends on others as well that means
mixture of choice and synchronization. It also successfully suggests the dependency
between IsMatchTableRowCount and IsMatchTableColumnRanges that is a control
link in the running example. The results also give a clear view of frequency by an-
notating numbers on each event and arc, where numbers in event boxes mean how
many times the events happen in the event logs, and numbers on arcs mean how
many times the two events directly succeed each other.
Using the Heuristic Miner The heuristics Miner is a practical applicable mining
algorithm that can deal with noise, and can be used to express the main behavior (i.e.
not all details and exceptions) registered in an event log [36]. It includes three steps:
(1) the construction of the dependency graph, (2) for each activity, the construction
of the input and output expressions and (3) the search for long distance dependency
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Figure 3.8: Genetic Mining Result
relations. Figure 3.9 shows the result of heuristics miner on the running example.
Although IsMatchCSVFileTables does not directly succeed ReadCSVReadyFile in
event logs, heuristics miner successfully suggests their dependency with reliability
0.833 and it happens 5 times in event logs considering long distance dependency
relations. This is particularly useful in the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows, just as
the running example, many scientiﬁc workﬂows have multiple tasks even hundreds
of tasks scheduled in parallel, not each parallel task succeed the dependent task
directly in provenance, therefore, long distance dependency discovery is especially
important in the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows.
3.1.2.3 Analyzing Scientiﬁc Workﬂows
Using LTL Checking The size of provenance is growing large quickly, Linear
Temporal Logical (LTL) checking is a great tool to help scientists discovering and
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Figure 3.9: Heuristic Mining Result
double checking temporal properties of provenance. As shown in Figure 3.10, we can
easily check whether ReadCSVFileColumnNames eventually happens when IsEx-
istsCSVFile happens, it is true for 27 instances while false for 4 instances, for further
information, the speciﬁc workﬂow run can be referred to according to workﬂow run
identiﬁer.
Figure 3.10: LTL Checking Example
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Figure 3.11: Dotted Chart Analysis
Using Dotted Chart A dotted chart oﬀers insight of performance during scien-
tiﬁc workﬂow execution, thus enables improving the performance of a workﬂow by
exploiting an episodic memory of prior workﬂow executions. Figure 3.11 shows part
of the result using dotted chart analysis on an example1, in which each row is a
task in workﬂow and each dot is an occurrence of the corresponding task along the
time scale, so we can easily see the performance of scientiﬁc workﬂow execution in
the perspective of tasks and take corresponding actions such as distributing tasks
further.
3.1.3 Related Works
The cloud computing and other technologies are changing the way we create, share
and use information, which oﬀers great beneﬁts but also exposes us to serious new
problems. [34] believes that provenance will play an essential role in this revolution,
providing data integrity, trustworthiness, authenticity, and availability, while oﬀer-
ing potential beneﬁts to information retrieval, collaboration, and scientiﬁc compu-
tation. [37] aims at mining provenance, by applying Case Based Reasoning (CBR)
methods to provenance to support scientists' workﬂow generation process, which
does not generate the whole workﬂow but focusing on assisting workﬂow composi-
1http://www.myexperiment.org/workﬂows/158.html
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tion by providing recommendation to scientists regarding each interested task. [38]
addresses the queries from the provenance challenge workshop such as semantic rea-
soning which exposes the implicit links between provenance, e.g. the implicit links
between provenance of studying any part of a human's body including chest, legs,
arms and etc. An abstraction over the provenance information is presented by two
means: one is the users' speciﬁed annotations that draw an interpretative link be-
tween tasks, and the other is the typed views that hide or expose the execution
details of an iteration or a nested run, or the data lineage of a collection and its
elements. Other works such as [39], [40] and [41] also address the queries from the
provenance challenge workshop, however do not deal with mining processes from
provenance.
3.1.4 Discussion
3.1.4.1 Results of diﬀerent process discovery algorithms
Section 3.1.2.2 presents results of four diﬀerent process discovery algorithms on
the running example. Table 3.1 discusses the results in the context of scientiﬁc
workﬂows. Note that the result of each miner is correct based on given provenance,
but providing diﬀerent views of the provenance. It is found that the result of the
fuzzy miner is closest to the original scientiﬁc workﬂow in the running example.
Section 3.1.4.3 discusses a possible way to improve the results in Table 3.1.
3.1.4.2 Number of Traces in Provenance
As Figure 3.2 shows, this section uses provenance from scientiﬁc workﬂow manage-
ment systems. A question that current tools can not address is how many times
should the scientiﬁc workﬂow be run to get enough traces. There should be a ﬁxed
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Table 3.1: Discussion on results of process discovery algorithms
Description Result
Fuzzy
Miner
Provides a zoom-able view
of scientiﬁc workﬂows by
controlling signiﬁcance
cutoﬀ to show tasks at
diﬀerent importance level.
Under certain signiﬁcance cutoﬀ, the
fuzzy miner successfully gives the
changed part and unchanged part.
Comparing with original scientiﬁc
workﬂow, the fuzzy miner gets most
dependency correctly, but concludes
some dependency that does not exist.
Alpha
Miner
Provides a view of direct
succession between tasks
in provenance.
Assuming the completeness of direct
succession, the alpha miner fails to
give a view close to the original
scientiﬁc workﬂow.
Genetic
Miner
Provides a view of
frequency for both tasks
and succession between
tasks, and discovers all
common control-ﬂow
structures assuming the
existence of noise.
The genetic miner gets a good view of
structures and frequencies, yet gives
some wrong dependencies which does
not exist in both the original scientiﬁc
workﬂow and the results of the fuzzy
miner.
Heuristic
Miner
Provides a view of
scientiﬁc workﬂows by
considering long distance
dependency.
The heuristic miner gives long
distance dependency successfully, but
gives too much dependency for some
tasks such as
ReadCSVFileColumnNames.
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point after that no more precedence relations to be discovered even given additional
provenance. This section manually ﬁnd a point after that the mined results do not
change signiﬁcantly with additional provenance.
3.1.4.3 Build Scientiﬁc Workﬂows using Data Dependency
Scientiﬁc workﬂows include data dependency and control dependency, provenance
provides data dependency besides temporal sequences. The method provided in this
section only uses the temporal sequences of tasks in provenance to mine dependency
among tasks. Data dependency can contribute to process mining for improving the
mining result, but process mining and its existing tools do not accept explicit data
dependency as source. Since provenance provides data dependency, we can derive
causality relation from data dependency, which compliments the causality relation
extracted from the precedence of tasks.
3.1.4.4 Incremental Scientiﬁc Workﬂow Mining
Scientiﬁc problem solving is an evolving process. Scientists start with a set of ques-
tions then observe phenomenon, gather data, develop hypotheses, perform tests,
negate or modify hypotheses, reiterate the process with various data, and ﬁnally
come up with a new set of questions, theories, or laws. Often before this process
can end in results, scientists will ﬁne-tune the experiments, going through many
iterations with diﬀerent parameters [28]. Updating scientiﬁc workﬂows is hence a
challenge for scientists. We believe with pre-existing scientiﬁc workﬂow template,
created either manually or automatically through mining, we can apply process
mining to update it based on new provenance obtained from either workﬂow based
systems or non-workﬂow systems. We are working on incremental scientiﬁc work-
ﬂow mining. Incremental mining can utilize the information in existing scientiﬁc
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workﬂow templates to make mining more eﬃcient for large scale scientiﬁc workﬂows
and more eﬀective for addressing existing scientiﬁc workﬂow templates.
3.1.5 Conclusion
This section provides a method using process mining to build and analyze scientiﬁc
workﬂows, which oﬀers a new approach to build large scale workﬂows in the con-
text of scientiﬁc workﬂows. Recent eﬀorts from scientiﬁc workﬂow community on
capturing provenance present a new opportunity for using provenance. This section
presents a method using process mining based on provenance to build and analyze
scientiﬁc workﬂows, which provides a new direction in using captured provenance.
Given the fact that provenance captured in any scientiﬁc workﬂow based systems or
system level monitoring systems contains information about tasks and their tempo-
ral order, there is always a way to translate the provenance to XES format acceptable
to process mining tools, the method provided in this section can be applied to any
scientiﬁc workﬂow management systems.
3.2 A Method to Mine Petri Nets by Improving Process Min-
ing Algorithms with Data Dependency
This section presents a method of improving process mining algorithms with data
dependency. The method is applied to ﬁnd a scientiﬁc workﬂow model from prove-
nance and to provide recommendation support during scientiﬁc workﬂows composi-
tion based on the mined workﬂows, as shown in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12: Background of the method described in this section (denoted by solid
arrows)
3.2.1 What are Scientiﬁc Workﬂows and Provenance?
There are many works on scientiﬁc workﬂows and provenance, that use diﬀer-
ent terminology for scientiﬁc workﬂows and diﬀerent ways to organize provenance
[42][43][28][5]. The common basics of scientiﬁc workﬂow and provenance this section
relies on are given as follows.
A task is a procedure or a group of procedures to execute computational activ-
ities. A data product can be a single data object or a collection of data objects.
A scientiﬁc workﬂow is a directed graph where nodes are tasks and edges between
nodes represent either data dependency or control dependency. Provenance records
the task invocations and data products used or generated by each invocation. For-
mally, Provenance ⊆ P(Data×Task×Data) . Data dependency is the relationship
between two tasks t1 and t2 when t2 need t1's output as input, denoted as t1 ≺d t2.
Formally, t1 ≺d t2 iﬀ ∃d1, d2, d3 ∈ Data  (d1, t1, d2) ∈ Provenance ∧ (d2, t2, d3) ∈
Provenance . Data dependency can be derived from provenance as causality rela-
tion pairs, such as t1 ≺d t2. Control dependency is the relationship between two
tasks t1 and t2 when a task t1 is required to be invoked before invoking another task
t2, it is denoted as a causality relation pair t1 ≺c t2. A causality relation pair infers
data dependency or control dependency, denoted as t1 ≺ t2. A task trace, corre-
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sponds to a run of a scientiﬁc workﬂow, is a sequence of task invocations. Formally,
let Σ be the set of all tasks that appear in task traces, a task trace is a sequence of
task invocations, denoted as t1, t2, t3, ..., tm where ti ∈ Σ for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
3.2.2 Scientiﬁc Workﬂow Models in Petri Nets
The algorithm in this section mines a Petri net as a model to represent a scientiﬁc
workﬂow. Tasks are modeled by transitions and causal relations are modeled by
places and arcs. A place corresponds to a condition which can be used as pre-
condition and/or post-condition for tasks. An AND-split corresponds to a transition
with two or more output places, and an AND-join corresponds to a transition with
two or more input places. OR-splits/OR-joins correspond to places with multiple
outgoing/ingoing arcs.
This section uses WF-nets [44] that is based on Place/Transition nets, a variant
of the classic Petri net model.
Deﬁnition 4. Place/Transition nets
A Place/Transition net, or simply a P/T-net, is a tuple (P, T, F,M) where
1. P is a ﬁnite set of places,
2. T is a ﬁnite set of transitions such that P ∩ T = ∅, and
3. F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) is a set of directed arcs.
4. M : P → N is a function that associate each place with a natural number.
A place p is an input place of a transition t, also called pre-condition, if there is a
directed arc from the place p to the transition t, i.e. (p, t) ∈ F . Similarly a place p
is an output place of a transition t, also called post-condition, if (t, p) ∈ F .
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Figure 3.13: A sample workﬂow (the circle arrow denotes control dependency, and
the other arrows denote data dependency)
Deﬁnition 5. Workﬂow nets
Let N = (P, T, F,M) be a P/T-net and t′ be a transition such that t′ /∈ P ∪ T ,
N is a workﬂow net (WF-net) iﬀ:
1. Object creation: P contains an input place i such that •i = ∅,
2. Object completion: P contains an output place o such that o• = ∅,
3. Connectedness: N ′ = (P, T ∪ {t′}, F ∪ {(o, t′), (t′, i)}) is strongly connected.
3.2.3 A Simple Example
To illustrate the principle of the algorithm in this section, we consider the task trace
extracted from provenance shown in Table 3.2. Suppose the workﬂow that generated
the provenance is given in Figure 3.13. Consider the fact that scientiﬁc workﬂows
evolve quickly thus the change is recorded in provenance, and provenance capturing
systems support non-workﬂow environment, the workﬂows behind the provenance
are often unknown before mining. Since the control ﬂow does not generate any
data product, we cannot get the control ﬂow from provenance. This section aims at
mining the control dependency from provenance to provide recommendation support
during workﬂow composition.
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Table 3.2: A task trace in provenance
Workﬂow Running Identiﬁer Task Identiﬁer
1 a
2 a
1 b
2 e
1 c
2 b
2 c
1 d
2 d
1 e
Table 3.3: Direct precedence table
a b c d e
a 0 1 0 0 1
b 0 0 2 0 0
c 0 0 0 2 0
d 0 0 0 0 1
e 0 1 0 0 0
3.2.4 Construction of a Causality Table
Deﬁnition 6. Direct precedence table
For n tasks, the direct precedence table is a n × n matrix P , P = [pij] where
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and pij is the number of times that task ti directly precede task tj.
Using the example above, a direct precedence table is shown in Table 3.3.
Deﬁnition 7. Indirect precedence table
For n tasks, the indirect precedence table is a n × n matrix S, S = [sij] where
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and sij is calculated as follows. For task ti and tj, in each workﬂow
run, if there is a sequence ti, tk, ..., tm, tj, suppose the number of tasks from tk to
tm is m − k + 1, add δm−k+1 (δ = 0.8) to sij. 0.8 is chosen after experimentation
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Table 3.4: Indirect precedence table
a b c d e
a 0 0.8 1.44 1.152 0.512
b 0 0 0 1.6 0.64
c 0 0 0 0 0.8
d 0 0 0 0 0
e 0 0 0.8 0.64 0
Table 3.5: Weight table
a b c d e
a 0 3.8 3.44 1.152 3.512
b 0 0 2 1.6 0.64
c 0 0 0 4 0.8
d 0 0 0 0 1
e 0 1 0.8 0.64 0
which satisﬁes two requirements: 1) for direct precedence, δm−k+1 = 1; 2) The longer
distance, the smaller addition.
Using the example above, an indirect precedence table is shown in Table 3.4.
According to the deﬁnition, data dependency can be derived from provenance as
causality relation pairs. For the example above, it is a ≺d e, a ≺d c, a ≺d b, c ≺d d.
Following is the construction of weight table combining both precedence tables and
data dependency.
Deﬁnition 8. Weight table
For n tasks, the weight table is a n× n matrix W , W = [wij] where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
and wij is calculated as follows. First, wij = pij + sij; second, if i ≺d j is present in
causality relation pairs derived from provenance as data dependencies, add σ to wij
where σ is the number of workﬂow running.
Using the example above, σ = 2, the weight table is shown in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.6: Conﬁdence table
a b c d e
a 0 3.8 3.44 1.152 3.512
b 0 0 2 1.6 -0.36
c 0 0 0 4 0
d 0 0 0 0 0.36
e 0 0.36 0 -0.36 0
Table 3.7: Causality table
Causality Relation Pair Weight
a ≺ b 3.8
b ≺ c 2
c ≺ d 4
d ≺ e 0.36
a ≺ e 3.512
e ≺ b 0.36
a ≺ c 3.44
a ≺ d 1.152
b ≺ d 1.6
e ≺ d -0.36
Deﬁnition 9. Conﬁdence table
For n tasks, the conﬁdence table is a n×n matrix C, C = [cij] where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
and cij is calculated as follows: cij = wij − wji.
Using the example above, the conﬁdence table is shown in Table 3.6.
The causality table is shown in Table 3.7. For each pair t1 ≺ t2, if it is not data
dependency t1 ≺d t2, then it is control dependency t1 ≺c t2.
Rules are designed as below to update causality table:
1. For tasks tk, tm and its causality tk ≺ tm, if its weight is lower than 1, remove
it.
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decb
a
Figure 3.14: A resulting Petri net (all causality pairs are included, and an AND-split
is used for task a)
2. For tasks tk, tm and its causality tk ≺ tm, if there is tk ≺ ... ≺ tm, in which
each pair has higher conﬁdence than the one of tk ≺ tm, remove tk ≺ tm from
causality table.
Firstly, for each valid causality, there are many chances to get higher than 1, such
as direct precedence, data dependency, or indirect precedence (e.g. 0.82 + 0.84 =
1.0496 > 1). Secondly, For tk ≺ ... ≺ tm, it is highly possible that tk ≺ tm get higher
than 1 for multiple indirect precedences, but actually there is no direct causality
between tk and tm.
Using the steps and rules above for the example, valid causality pairs are derived:
a ≺ b, b ≺ c, c ≺ d, a ≺ e, a ≺ c, a Petri net can be constructed as Figure 3.14, which
matches exactly the original workﬂow.
The construction of a causality table is summarized in Algorithm 3.1.
3.2.5 Generating a Petri Net from a Causality Table
It is straightforward to derive a causality graph from a causality table, but it requires
additional information to generate a Petri net from a causality table, including
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Algorithm 3.1 Construction of a Causality Table
Input: Provenance for σ running of a workﬂow that contains n tasks
Output: A causality table T
1: for all workﬂow running instances Run do
2: for all (ti, tj) ti directly precedes tj do
3: pij++
4: end for
5: for all (ti, tj) ti indirectly precedes tj do
6: Assume the sequence as ti, tk, ..., tm, tj
7: δ = 0.8
8: sij+= δ
m−k+1
9: end for
10: end for
11: for i = 1 to n do
12: for j = 1 to n do
13: wij = pij + sij
14: if ∃d1, d2, d3 ∈ Data  (d1, ti, d2) ∈ Run ∧ (d2, tj, d3) ∈ Run then
15: wij+=σ
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: for i = 1 to n do
20: for j = 1 to n do
21: cij = wij − wji
22: if cij ≥ 1 then
23: T = T ∪ {(ti ≺ tj, cij)}
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27: for all (ti ≺ tj, cij) ∈ T do
28: if ∃tk ≺ ... ≺ tm  (ti ≺ tk) ∧ (tm ≺ tj) ∧ (cik > cij) ∧ (...) ∧ (cmj > cij) then
29: T = T\{(ti ≺ tj, cij)}
30: end if
31: end for
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parallelism and choice of tasks. In Petri nets, parallelism can be represented with
a AND-split, and choice can be represented with a OR-split. For instance, if there
are causality pairs ti ≺ tj and ti ≺ tk, the type of a split from ti to tj AND/OR tk
has to be detected, to generate a Petri net. The principle of detection is to employ
the weight table above to check the pattern of tj and tk: 1) wjk = 0 and wkj = 0,
that shows the pattern tjtk or tktj cannot appear, it is an OR-split; 2) Otherwise,
that shows the pattern tjtk or tktj can appear, it is an AND-split. The algorithm
to detect the type of a split is given in Algorithm 3.2. It is assumed that a OR-split
is placed after an AND-split, i.e. it is conjunctions of clauses, and each clause is a
disjunction of tasks.
Algorithm 3.2 Detection of the type of the splits
Input: Weight table w, task t0 and tasks t1, ...ti, ..., tn in which t0 ≺ ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
is a causality pair
Output: A set of clauses Disj in which each is a set of tasks that are in the OR-
relation
A set of tasks Conj in which each is in the AND-relation
1: Derive W ′ from W with the rows and columns related with t1, ...ti, ..., tn
2: Let W ′ = [w
′
ij]; Disj = ∅; Conj = ∅
3: Create n empty sets: Seti where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: for j = 1 to n do
6: if w
′
ij=0 & w
′
ji=0 & i 6= j then
7: Seti = Seti ∪ {i, j}
8: Setj = Setj ∪ {i, j}
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: for i = 1 to n do
13: if Seti is empty then
14: Conj = Conj ∪ {ti}
15: else
16: Disj = Disj ∪ {< Seti >}
17: end if
18: end for
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3.2.6 Providing Recommendation for Scientiﬁc Workﬂow Com-
position
Given a partial workﬂow, based on a set of causality tables and a set of Petri nets,
this section provides a method to recommend a next most likely task and related
part of a Petri net.
A causality path is a sequence of tasks t1, ..., ti, ...tn in which ti ≺ ti+1 (1 ≤ i < n)
are causality pairs. The length of causality path is n.
For the current task t0 selected in the partial workﬂow, a set of possible next
tasks can be easily found by looking up the set of causality tables as {pi | t0 ≺ pi
and 1 ≤ i ≤ m}, where m is the number of tasks found. A method is given in
Algorithm 3.3 to provide recommendation. Firstly, the method gives an indicator
on each causality table how it matches the given partial workﬂow. Secondly, for
each possible next task, the method gets a recommendation rate by two factors: the
weight of the corresponding causality pairs and the indicator of match level. Finally,
the method gives recommendation conﬁdence Confi for each possible next task:
Confi =
ratei∑m
j=1 ratej
where ratei is the recommendation rate for each possible next task.
3.3 Evaluation
The method described in this chapter is evaluated using a Java program for the
accuracy of recommendation. The provenance being used in this section are gen-
erated with a real scientiﬁc workﬂow from the open scientiﬁc workﬂow repository
myExperiment, that is the challenge workﬂow from the third Provenance Challenge
(http://www.myexperiment.org/workﬂows/750).
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Algorithm 3.3 Providing Recommendation
Input: A causality path that end at current task t0 in the partial workﬂow
tn, ..., ti, ...t0;
a set of causality tables {Tj | 1 ≤ j ≤ k }
Output: A set of possible next tasks with recommendation rates R
1: Let the set of possible next tasks be
{pi | t0 ≺ pi and 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
2: for j = 1 to k do
3: matchj = 1
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: if ∃ (tx ≺ ty, wxy) ∈ Tj
tx = ti−1 ∧ ty = ti then
6: matchj++
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: for i = 1 to m do
11: ratei = 0
12: for j = 1 to k do
13: if ∃ (t0 ≺ pi, wi) ∈ Tj then
14: ratei+=wi ×matchj
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: for i = 1 to m do
19:
R = R ∪ {(pi, ratei∑m
j=0 ratej
)}
20: end for
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To evaluate the accuracy of recommendation, the method is applied to each task
of workﬂows. For each task ti, there are n dependent tasks, and there are p possible
next tasks with recommendation conﬁdence. n tasks are picked up from the set of
possible next tasks with highest conﬁdence if available, in which there are m tasks
matched with one of n dependent tasks, that is m hits out of n real ones. And, it
is also m hits out of p recommendations. The accuracy of recommendation for each
task is deﬁned as:
accuracyi =
m2
n× p
.
Figure 3.15 compares the method described in this chapter to the methods using
only control dependency or only data dependency for recommendation. The α
algorithm only mine control dependency while most recommendation algorithms
uses only data dependency, this chapter combines both control dependency and
data dependency to improve the recommendation accuracy. As shown in Figure 3.15,
our method performs better than the method that mines only control dependency,
because the data dependency is utilized in the algorithm to assist mining control
dependency; and our method performs better than the method that uses only data
dependency except in a task, because for some tasks that has only data dependency,
our method may give false control dependency, thus lower down the accuracy.
3.4 Related Works
The α algorithm [44] assumes completeness of event logs, this chapter proposes an
algorithm based on the α algorithm to use data dependency improving the mining
result. There are also a number of process mining algorithms implemented to mine
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Figure 3.15: Comparison of Recommendation Accuracy for Diﬀerent Methods
incomplete events logs, such as fuzzy miner, heuristic miner. The fuzzy miner [35] as-
sumes that problems in mining large scale processes are caused by mismatch between
fundamental assumptions of traditional process mining, and the characteristics of
real-life processes. Fuzzy miner developed an adaptive simpliﬁcation and visualiza-
tion technique for process models, which is based on two metrics, signiﬁcance and
correlation. The two metrics are similar to the concept of data clustering domain
where a binary distance metric is inferred to ﬁnd related subsets of attributes. In
the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows, signiﬁcance, which can be determined both for
tasks and precedence relations over them, measures the relative importance of be-
havior. As such, it speciﬁes the level of interest we have in tasks and their control
dependency. Correlation is only relevant for precedence relations over tasks, which
measures how closely related two events following one another are. The heuristics
miner is a practical applicable mining algorithm that can deal with noise, and can
be used to express the main behavior (i.e. not all details and exceptions) registered
in an event log [36]. It includes three steps: (1) the construction of the dependency
graph, (2) for each activity, the construction of the input and output expressions
and (3) the search for long distance dependency relations. All those miners do not
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utilize data dependency, the algorithm of this chapter can be applied to any of them
enhancing the mining result.
This chapter is related to workﬂow recommendation papers based on provenance.
Besides the diﬀerence in recommendation technique with other papers, this chap-
ter has a unique advantage that it can build a whole workﬂow model for general
reference. The work in [37], based on large scale databases of workﬂow execution
traces, proposes exploiting these databases with a knowledge light approach to
reuse, applying case based reasoning (CBR) methods to those traces to support sci-
entists' workﬂow generation process in two phases. The ﬁrst phase is retrieving from
a database the entries for all workﬂows containing any one of the current tasks, the
second phase is similarity assessment based on the ranking by the size of the largest
mapping produced between current tasks and retrieved cases. This chapter uses a
diﬀerent approach to do recommendation for workﬂow generation, which has two
advantages compared with [37]: this chapter does not use expensive graph matching
algorithms, thus is more eﬃcient; and this chapter can make recommendation on
both data dependency and control dependency while [37] only considers data de-
pendency in their analysis. [45] makes recommendation based on the path in partial
workﬂow, instead of last node in partial workﬂow. Provenance are synthetically
generated from a set of nodes, as a set of node sequences. If there is a path, that
has 5 possible following nodes, each of 5 nodes then has 20% conﬁdence, it would be
diﬃcult to determine the threshold. [46] proposes a framework for service oriented
scientiﬁc workﬂow reuse, its recommendation is based on searching a collection of
workﬂows with the help of annotation. They ﬁrst collect scientiﬁc workﬂows from
centralized repositories such as myExperiment, then integrates annotations gener-
ated from various heterogeneous data sources such as author annotations at diﬀerent
levels (for example, workﬂow, service, or data channels), user comments at runtime,
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best practices, and statistical data of existing scientiﬁc workﬂows and services, in-
cluding popularity and usage patterns. They also support manual annotation. With
the collected workﬂows and integrated annotations, they uses Apache Lucene, an
open source search engine, to index the information in collection and associated
annotations. Their method can provide relevant information, but cannot suggest a
conﬁdence level of each recommendation.
There is also a related work in data mining area that focuses on pairwise temporal
patterns [47]. They state the problem of mining event relationships as: given event
sequence, ﬁnding all pairwise statistically dependent patterns that can be character-
ized as temporal patterns, that assert dependency between events and specify the
timing information, such as event a happens after event b, say, about 5 minutes.
Their result is in fact the precedence table in this chapter. Since this chapter focuses
on scientiﬁc workﬂow area, provenance provides workﬂow running identiﬁer for each
event so that it is obvious to get the precedence table, which is the pairwise event
dependency in [47]. Combined with algorithms in [47], this chapter can be applied
to unstructured data, or semi-structured data, such as computer system log ﬁles.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presents a method based on provenance to mine models for scientiﬁc
workﬂows, including data and control dependency. The mining result can either
suggest part of others' workﬂows for consideration, or make familiar part of work-
ﬂow easily accessible, thus provide recommendation support for scientiﬁc workﬂows
composition, which oﬀers a new approach to build workﬂows in the context of scien-
tiﬁc workﬂows. Given the fact that provenance captured in any scientiﬁc workﬂow
based systems or system level monitoring systems contains information about tasks
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and their temporal order, the proposed algorithm can give both control and data de-
pendency for recommendation during scientiﬁc workﬂows composition. The method
provided in this chapter can be applied to any scientiﬁc workﬂow management sys-
tems.
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CHAPTER 4
MCPATOM: A PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS TOOL FOR ATOMICITY
VIOLATION USING MODEL CHECKING
4.1 Overview
Multi-core hardware is a growing industry trend, for both high performance servers
and low power mobile devices. Multi-thread programs can exploit multi-core pro-
cessors at their full potential. In the real world, most servers and high-end critical
software are multi-threaded. Unfortunately, multi-thread programs are prone to
bugs due to the inherent complexity caused by concurrency. It is diﬃcult to detect
concurrency bugs due to the huge number of possible interleavings. Many concur-
rency bugs escape from testing into software releases and cause some of the most
serious computer-related accidents in history, including a blackout leaving tens of
millions of people without electricity [9].
Among diﬀerent types of concurrency bugs, atomicity violation bugs are the most
common one. Atomicity violation bugs are caused by violations to the atomicity
of certain code regions without proper synchronization. They widely exist in the
real world systems and contributed to about 70% of the examined non-deadlock
concurrency bugs [10]. Therefore, techniques for detecting atomicity violation bugs
are extremely important.
This chapter presents a dynamic prediction tool McPatom to predict atomicity
violation bugs involving a pair of threads accessing a shared variable using model
checking, based on binary executables that use POSIX thread library. McPatom uses
memory access patterns instead of subroutine atomicity. The only input needed by
McPatom is a binary executable, while source code is optional for locating bugs.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of McPatom Framework to predict atomicity violation bugs
using model checking
The McPatom framework contains the following major steps: (1) using Pin [48]
to instrument an interleaved execution of a multi-thread program and to record an
interleaved trace containing only atomicity violation impacting events including all
shared variable accesses and all synchronization routines (locks, condition variables,
barriers and thread management events); (2) projecting the interleaved trace into a
partial order thread model of abstract threads, which maintains the causal relation
within actual threads imposed by the synchronization routines; (3) automatically
translating the partial order thread model into a Promela program for model check-
ing in Spin [19]; (4) deﬁning a complete set of atomicity violation patterns involving
a pair of threads accessing every single shared variable and automatically translat-
ing them into temporal logic formulas; (5) using Spin to model check the atomicity
violation patterns; and (6) mapping the violation reported in Spin to the execution
trace in the original multi-thread program. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of McPatom
framework.
Our work makes the following contributions:
1. A method to extract a thread model from an instrumented interleaved trace
that only records events related to atomicity violations. Such an interleaved
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trace is much smaller than the program behavior in a complete execution. Fur-
thermore the extracted thread model enables the checking of all alternative
traces with the same causal relationships as the interleaved trace. The com-
pleteness of instrumented interleaved traces and the extracted thread models
is proved.
2. A complete set of the patterns of unserializable interleavings involving two
threads (most concurrency bugs involve only two threads [11]) containing any
number of accesses to a shared variable (either user deﬁned or every word sized
dynamically allocated memory accessed by multiple threads). These patterns
generalize and cover the three accesses proposed in [10][12]. These atomicity
violation patterns become property speciﬁcations to be checked.
3. A unique prediction tool - McPatom, for detecting atomicity violation bugs
through model checking. McPatom instruments interleaved executions, ex-
tracts thread models from interleaved traces, automatically converts (1) thread
models into Promela programs and (2) atomicity violation patterns into prop-
erty speciﬁcations. By constraining the checking within a pair of threads
involving one shared variable at a time, the interleaving space to be checked is
vastly reduced. As a result, McPatom is applicable to large software systems.
McPatom can predict atomicity violations that do not manifest during testing
or runtime.
We applied McPatom to predict several known atomicity violations in real world
systems as well as an atomicity violation that cannot be detected by several existing
tools. We obtained favorable experimental results with regard to atomicity violation
predictability, accuracy and performance of using McPatom.
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4.2 Extracting Partial Order Thread Models fromMulti-thread
Program Executions
4.2.1 Description of the Partial Order Thread Model
A multi-thread program has a set of threads and a set of shared variables. Shared
variables are addresses of global variables and every word sized dynamically allo-
cated memory accessed by multiple threads. The same memory address is considered
as another shared variable if it is released and reallocated through the invocations
of memory functions. An execution σ = s1, ..., sn of a multi-thread program P is a
sequence of executed statements. A trace is the projection of an execution to a se-
quence of annotated shared variable accesses and synchronization events. Formally,
a trace, τ = e1, ..., em is a sequence of events where each event ei(1 ≤ i ≤ m) is
a tuple 〈tidi, timestampi, actioni〉 in which tidi is a thread handle, timestampi is
a time stamp based on real time and actioni is one of the following: (read/write,
a shared variable), (a synchronization routine, a synchronization variable) or (a
thread management operation, a thread handle). McPatom uses POSIX Threads
in which a synchronization routine is a routine related to semaphores, mutex locks,
condition variables and barriers, does not handle user-deﬁned synchronization prim-
itives. McPatom also assumes a shared variable as a synchronization variable if it
is accessed by synchronization routines, thus does not treat its accesses as shared
variable accesses.
Lemma 4. A trace τ = e1, ..., em extracted from an execution sequence σ = s1, ..., sn
is sound and complete with respect to σ in terms of atomicity violation predictability.
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Proof. (1) Soundness: An atomicity violation revealed in τ must exist in σ. This is
obvious since τ is a projection of σ. An atomicity violation pattern appearing in τ
exists in σ.
(2) Completeness: Any existing atomicity violation in σ remains in τ . Since
atomicity violations do not depend on general program states, and only depend on
the execution orders of shared variable accesses and synchronization events, that are
completely captured in τ .
Deﬁnition 10 (Partial Order Thread Model). Given a trace τ = e1, ..., em con-
taining shared variable accesses and synchronization events, a partial order thread
model (Eτ ,≺) is deﬁned as follows:
1. Eτ = {ei | ei in τ}
2. ≺ is a partial order relation such that, for any ei, ej ∈ E (i 6= j), ei ≺ ej iﬀ
(a) tidi = tidj and i < j, or
(b) tidi 6= tidj, actioni = (Signal, cvar), actionj = (Wait, cvar) and ∀k 
((j < k < i) ∧ (actionk 6= (Signal, cvar)) in which cvar is a condition
variable, or
(c) tidi 6= tidj, actioni = (Wait, bvar) and (i < j)∧∃k  ((tidk = tidj)∧ (k <
j) ∧ actionk = (Wait, bvar) ∧ ∀h  ((tidh = tidk) ⇒ ¬(k < h < j))) in
which bvar is a barrier variable, or
(d) tidi 6= tidj, actioni = (Create, tidj), or
(e) tidi 6= tidj, actionj = (Join, tidi).
3. Mutual exclusion: for any ei, ej, em, en ∈ E (i 6= j 6= m 6= n), ej ≺ em or
en ≺ ei iﬀ
84
(a) tidi = tidj, actioni = (Lock, lvar), actionj = (Unlock, lvar), and
(b) tidm = tidn, actionm = (Lock, lvar), actionn = (Unlock, lvar).
The above partial order relation (or simply causal relation) is similar to the
happened-before relation given in [49]. From the above deﬁnition, we have (1)
shared variable accesses within the same thread are ordered, and (2) a pair of shared
variable accesses from two diﬀerent threads are only ordered if and only if they are
constrained by some intermediate synchronization events such as one thread creating
the other.
While the partial order thread model (Eτ ,≺) respects the causal relation in trace
τ , it captures an equivalent class of alternative traces that obey the same causal re-
lation as τ , in which each alternative trace τ ′ is a result of rearranging some shared
variable accesses not constrained by ≺. The partial order thread model allows us to
explore all possible alternative traces that correspond to a set of feasible interleav-
ings in a multi-thread program, however, the model provides an over-approximation
without considering data-ﬂow, thus cannot guarantee each permissible trace in the
model is covered by some feasible interleaved execution in the multi-thread program
P.
4.2.2 Implementation of the Partial Order Thread Model
4.2.2.1 Capturing runtime traces and related source code
McPatom uses Pin binary instrumentation framework [48] to collect runtime trace
information, speciﬁcally including, every access to every shared variable and ev-
ery synchronization event using POSIX Thread (locks, condition variables, barriers,
thread joining and etc.). For each collected event, McPatom also ﬁnds the corre-
sponding source code information including ﬁle name and line number. The source
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3047143104 , 1, thread.c-624, Read , threads
3047143104 , 1, thread.c-172, Create , 3020999536
3020999536 , 1, thread.c-240, Lock , init_lock
3020999536 , 1, thread.c-241, Read , init_count
3020999536 , 1, thread.c-241, Write , init_count
3020999536 , 1, thread.c-242, Signal , init_cond
3020999536 , 1, thread.c-243, Unlock , init_lock
Figure 4.2: A Sample of a Partial Trace (The format of each line: thread handle,
timestamp, ﬁle name - line number, action)
code information can be used to help locating the predicted bugs. A sample of a
partial trace is shown in Figure 4.2.
4.2.2.2 Automatically encoding traces to Promela code
McPatom uses Spin model checker to detect atomicity violations in a partial order
thread model. This section shows how we realize a partial order thread model from
a recorded trace in Spin's underlying language Promela.
Deﬁning Shared Variable Accesses McPatom deﬁnes every shared variable v
as a short in Promela, automatically assigns a unique value for all reading accesses
and a unique value for all writing accesses in each thread. Formally, let rw ∈ {r, w}
and tid be thread ID, each access of v is deﬁned as v=rw+tid. Since the maximum
number of threads per process is limited to 64 in POSIX threads, McPatom sets r
to 0, and w to 64. For example, given two threads: t1(tid=1) and t2(tid=2), and a
shared variable v, McPatom makes the following assignments :
1. v = 64+1 for each writing access of v in thread t1,
2. v = 1 for each reading access of v in thread t1,
3. v = 64+2 for each writing access of v in thread t2,
4. v = 2 for each reading access of v in thread t2.
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#define NUM_LOCKS 100
short locked[NUM_LOCKS] = -1;
inline Lock(l) {
if
:: atomic {( locked[l] == -1) -> locked[l] = _pid}
fi;
}
inline Unlock(l) {
assert(locked[l] == _pid);
locked[l] = -1;
}
Figure 4.3: Promela Code Modeling Mutex Locks
Deﬁning Synchronization Primitives McPatom automatically generates Promela
code for all synchronization primitives. Due to space limit, we only present Promela
code for mutex locks. McPatom models synchronization events to capture the causal
relationships between threads, to prune infeasible interleavings. The Promela code
shown in Figure 4.3 models the POSIX Thread routines pthread_mutex_lock and
pthread_mutex_unlock. The atomic construct groups indivisible statements to-
gether to ensure no interleaving within an atomic sequence. Lock inline function
accepts a lock l as its argument. If lock l is not locked, Lock function locks it and
sets the owner to the thread that is the predeﬁned variable _pid for the executing
process in Promela. If lock l is in locked status, no guards are executable so that the
thread is blocked until lock l is available according to Promela semantics. Unlock
inline function simply sets lock l to unlocked status. It is exactly what is required
to model locking and unlocking of a mutex lock.
Deﬁning Threads All events with regard to a particular thread from the recorded
trace are grouped into a Promela process in which each event is represented by its
corresponding Promela code deﬁned in previous steps as shown in Figure 4.4. Since
the maximum number of threads per process in POSIX threads is 64, which is well
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proctype t1() { ... }
proctype t2()
{
Lock(init_lock); /* thread.c - 240 */
init_count = 0 + 2; /* thread.c - 241 */
init_count = 64 + 2; /* thread.c - 241 */
Signal(init_cond); /* thread.c - 242 */
Unlock(init_lock); /* thread.c - 243 */
...
}
init
{
run t2(); /* thread.c - 172 */
...
}
Figure 4.4: A Sample of Partial Promela Code
below the maximum number (256) of processes allowed in Promela, we do not have a
problem to encode all possible threads occurring in a recorded trace. The interleaved
execution of processes in the Promela program generates all alternative permissible
traces in the partial order thread model.
4.3 Deﬁning and Encoding Unserializable Interleaving Pat-
terns between Two Threads
Atomicity is a semantic correctness property for concurrent programs. A thread
interleaving is serializable if and only if it is equivalent to a serial execution, which
executes a code region without other threads interleaved in between. The code region
is typically enforced as atomic explicitly in the code. When proper synchronization
is missing to enforce atomicity, atomicity violation bugs may occur. [50] proved that
a thread interleaving is serializable if and only if its conﬂict graph is acyclic.
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Most concurrency bugs involve two threads, instead of a large number of threads,
based on the study in [11], in which 101 out of 105 bugs involved only two threads.
Thus atomicity violation bugs in a multi-thread program can be explored through
every pair of threads. Our work is inspired by the works in [10][12], which addressed
a special case of unserializable interleavings with three accesses of the same shared
variable. However, as Figure 4.5 shows, there are real world bugs involving four
accesses of the same shared variable. Furthermore, there can be more accesses
involved, such as reading accesses of a shared variable for logging purpose. The
patterns given in this chapter cover atomicity violation bugs involving any number
of accesses of a shared variable between a pair of threads.
4.3.1 Three-access and Four-access Atomicity Violation
Many recent works focused on three-access atomicity violations [10][12][11], which
involve one shared variable, two threads and three accesses to the variable. For sim-
plicity, two threads are referred as a local thread (Thread 1) and a remote thread
(Thread 2), the opposite view is also explored during the detection process. If two
consecutive accesses of a shared variable in a local thread are interleaved with an
access to the variable from a remote thread, the interleaving is a potential unserializ-
able one. In practice, unserializable interleavings indicate the presence of atomicity
violation bugs. The explanation of unserializable interleavings of three accesses and
many real world atomicity violation bugs can be found in [10].
Three-access atomicity violations are chosen by tools above because (1) there
are many real world atomicity violation bugs involving only three accesses, and
(2) checking only two accesses (current access and previous access) in a thread
can reduce the complexity of algorithms. However, some atomicity violation bugs
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Figure 4.5: A four-access atomicity violation bug [51] in Mozilla (Incorrect interleav-
ing 1 was detected by PSet [51] and missed by AVIO [10], while incorrect interleaving
2 cannot be detected by either PSet or AVIO.)
involve more than three accesses. A real world example [51] is shown in Figure 4.5.
The shared variable accesses in Thread 1 must be in an atomic region; otherwise,
a possible interleaving may result in HandleEvent function of Thread 2 returning
with a missing event. PSet [51] detected this bug (incorrect interleaving 1) since
PSet keeps track of either the last writer or the set of last readers for every memory
location. However PSet cannot detect the mutant of the bug (incorrect interleaving
2) because in PSet's view the mutant only involves a set of last readers and the
current reading access. AVIO [10] cannot detect this bug because it involves more
than three accesses.
4.3.2 Patterns of Two-thread Atomicity Violations involving
Any Number of Accesses
In the sequel, a two-thread atomicity violation refers to a two-thread atomicity viola-
tion involving any number of accesses of a shared variable, and A ∈ {Read,Write},
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Figure 4.6: Unserializable Interleavings with two threads. In (1)(2)(3)(5), W in
Thread 2 unexpectedly changes the value; In (4), An intermediate value in Thread
1 is read by Thread 2.
R = Read, W = Write, A∗ denotes zero or more A, A+ denotes one or more A, R∗
denotes zero or more R and R+ denotes one or more R. This section gives a set of
patterns covering all possible two-thread atomicity violations.
Figure 4.6 shows all possible scenarios of unserializable interleavings with only
one access from Thread 2. If any of the unserializable interleaving patterns is
matched, it indicates a potential atomicity violation.
Theorem 2 (Completeness of the set of Patterns in Figure 4.6). The set of patterns
in Figure 4.6 is complete, i.e. they cover all possible unserializable interleavings
between two threads.
Proof. Let At11 , A
t2
2 , ..., A
tn
n be a sequence of atomic accesses in an interleaved exe-
cution of two threads, in which Atii (ti ∈ {1, 2}, Atii ∈ {Read,Write}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n)
denotes an atomic access from thread ti to the same shared variable. Let every sub-
sequence of At11 , A
t2
2 , ..., A
tn
n be of the form B
1
1 , B
2
2 , B
1
3 where B
1
1 and B
1
3 of Thread 1
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are sequences of Atii (ti = 1), B
2
2 of Thread 2 is a sequence of A
ti
i (ti = 2). Let Pi be
pattern i. B22 is assumed to be or can be reduced without losing writing operations
to a single access A22. If B
1
1 , A
2
2, B
1
3 does not match with any of the patterns in
Figure 4.6, B11 , A
2
2, B
1
3 satisﬁes ¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ ¬P3 ∧ ¬P4 ∧ ¬P5. Since operator ∧ is
commutative, we can select a speciﬁc order and carry out an incremental analysis
of possible B11 , A
2
2, B
1
3 based on each of Pi(1 ≤ i ≤ 5).
1. B11 , A
2
2, B
1
3 satisﬁes ¬P1. B11 , A22, B13 can only be one of the following:
(a) B11 = A
∗WA∗, A22 = W , B
1
3 = A
+
(b) B11 = A
+, A22 = W , B
1
3 = A
∗WA∗
(c) B11 = A
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = A
+
2. B11 , A
2
2, B
1
3 satisﬁes ¬P1 ∧ ¬P2. B11 , A22, B13 can only be one of the following:
(a) B11 = A
∗WA∗, A22 = W , B
1
3 = A
∗WA∗
(b) B11 = A
+, A22 = W , B
1
3 = A
∗WA∗
(c) B11 = A
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = A
+
3. B11 , A
2
2, B
1
3 satisﬁes ¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ ¬P3. B11 , A22, B13 can only be one of the fol-
lowing:
(a) B11 = A
∗WA∗, A22 = W , B
1
3 = A
∗WA∗
(b) B11 = A
∗WA∗, A22 = W , B3 = A
∗WA∗ which is equivalent to above one.
(c) B11 = A
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = A
+
4. B11 , A
2
2, B
1
3 satisﬁes ¬P1 ∧¬P2 ∧¬P3 ∧¬P4. B11 , A22, B13 can only be one of the
following:
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(a) B11 = A
∗WA∗, A22 = W , B
1
3 = A
∗WA∗
(b) B11 = R
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = A
+
(c) B11 = A
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = R
+
5. B11 , A
2
2, B
1
3 satisﬁes ¬P1 ∧¬P2 ∧¬P3 ∧¬P4 ∧¬P5. B11 , A22, B13 can only be one
of the following:
(a) B11 = R
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = A
+
(b) B11 = A
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = R
+
According to the Serializability Theorem [50], an interleaved sequence is serializable
if and only if its conﬂict graph is acyclic. Either 5(a) B11 = R
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = A
+
or 5(b) B11 = A
+, A22 = R, B
1
3 = R
+ is serializable. Therefore, the completeness of
the set of patterns in Figure 4.6 is proved.
4.3.3 Automatically encoding atomicity violation patterns into
Linear time Temporal Logic (LTL) Formulas
For every shared variable and every pair of threads t1 and t2, McPatom automat-
ically deﬁnes a LTL formula (4.1) for each pattern in Figure 4.6 and another LTL
formula (4.2) reversing the view of t1 and t2. Let v be a shared variable, r = 0 and
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w = 64 as deﬁned in section 4.2.2.2, Ai ∈ {r, w}, and tidi , tidi ∈ {1, 2}.
[]! <> ((v == A1 + tid1)&&
X((v == A2 + tid2)U((v == A3 + tid3)&& (4.1)
X((v == A4 + tid4)U(v == A5 + tid5)))))
[]! <> ((v == A1 + tid1)&&
X((v == A2 + tid2)U((v == A3 + tid3)&& (4.2)
X((v == A4 + tid4)U(v == A5 + tid5)))))
where [] denotes Always, ! denotes Logical Negation, <> denotes Even-
tually, X denotes Next and U denotes Until. These formulas specify that the
atomicity violation patterns do not occur.
Using Figure 4.6 (2) as a concrete example, one formula in LTL is shown below:
[]! <> ((v == w + 1)&&
X((v == r + 1)U((v == w + 2)&& (4.3)
X((v == w + 2)U(v == r + 1)))))
(v == w+ 2)U(v == r+ 1) is true if and only if v == w+ 2 holds until v == r+ 1
is true or simply v == r + 1 holds without v == w + 2 holds. This subformula
captures W ∗2R
+
1 in which W
∗
2 means zero or more writing accesses from Thread
2, R+1 means one or more reading accesses from Thread 1. Furthermore, (v ==
w+2)&&X((v == w+2)U(v == r+1)) capturesW+2 R
+
1 and (v == r+1)U((v ==
w + 2)&&X((v == w + 2)U(v == r + 1))) reﬂects R∗1W
+
2 R
+
1 . Therefore, (4.3)
captures []! <> W1R
∗
1W
+
2 R
+
1 and ensures that patternW1R
∗
1W2R
+
1 in Figure 4.6 (2)
does not occur in the partial order thread model. The reason that the LTL formula
contains W+2 instead of W2 is that there can be synchronization events between W2
and R+1 , for each of those events, W2 needs to hold.
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4.4 Predictive Analysis of Atomicity Violation using Model
Checking
In this section, we discuss McPatom framework's general merits in terms of its
soundness and completeness as well as speciﬁc ways in using Spin model checker
[19] to show its applicability.
4.4.1 Soundness and completeness of McPatom
An important feature of a prediction method is its capability to predict as many
violations as possible. Since the majority of existing prediction methods uses an ab-
stract model extracted from one interleaved execution at a time from a multi-thread
program, a prediction method's capability rests on the quality of the abstract model
built and its thoroughness in exploring the permissible traces in the abstract model.
McPatom extracts the least constrained partial order thread model respecting the
causal relation from the observed interleaved execution and uses model checking to
explore all permissible traces in the partial order thread model.
Theorem 3. McPatom ensures the completeness of its prediction - any possible
atomicity violation involving a pair of threads accessing one shared variable in the
partial order thread model can be detected.
Proof. McPatom encodes all possible atomicity violation patterns involving a pair
of threads accessing one shared variable (Theorem 2) into linear time temporal
logic formulas. McPatom uses model checking to exhaustively check whether any
temporal logic formula fails in the partial order thread model. Thus none of possible
atomicity violation will be undetected.
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In general, McPatom cannot guarantee the soundness of its prediction, i.e., each
predicted atomicity violation is covered by a feasible execution, since data-ﬂow is
ignored in the partial order thread model.
One major potential problem using model checking is the state explosion prob-
lem. Fortunately, the state explosion problem will not occur in atomicity violation
prediction due to the following reasons (1) the partial order thread model (cap-
turing only shared variable accesses and synchronization events) used for model
checking is drastically smaller compared to the original multi-thread program, (2)
each atomicity violation pattern to be checked involves only one shared variable,
and (3) checking each atomicity violation pattern does not depend on the value of
the shared variable. Another possible problem with model checking is the potential
exponential number of possible interleavings due to the number of threads involved
and the number of shared variable accesses. This problem is partially resolved (1)
due to our focus on checking atomicity violations involving only two threads, (2) due
to the constraints imposed by causal relations that drastically reduce the number of
potential interleavings generated by the number of shared variable accesses, and (3)
due to our implementation strategies of grouping all reading event sequences in each
thread into atomic blocks in Spin to achieve partial order reductions and enforcing
the wait/signal order of condition variables in the observed execution while explor-
ing alternative interleavings. Our experiment results show very good performance
using model checking.
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70: proc 2 (t13) spin_av.pml :551 (state 28) [sharedvariable
= (0+13)]
72: proc 3 (t48) spin_av.pml :591 (state 31) [sharedvariable
= (64+48)]
76: proc 2 (t13) spin_av.pml :552 (state 29) [sharedvariable
= (0+13)]
Figure 4.7: A Sample of Atomicity Violation Trace Reported by Spin
4.4.2 Using Spin model checker to ﬁnd atomicity violation
traces
McPatom selects Spin model checker [19] based on its maturity, popularity, and ca-
pability. Spin is used to check every atomicity violation freedom property involving
every pair of threads accessing every single shared variable one at a time in the par-
tial order thread model extracted from a single interleaved trace recorded through
instrumentation using Pin. Based on the partial order thread model encoded in
Promela in section 4.2.2.2, and the atomicity violation freedom property encoded in
LTL formulas in section 4.3.3, McPatom uses Spin to ﬁnd atomicity violation traces
or report no atomicity violations. Figure 4.7 gives an example of atomicity violation
reported by Spin, which is mapped to real code in the original program.
Spin can be conﬁgured to search all errors or stop at the ﬁrst error. McPatom
chooses to stop at the ﬁrst error, thus McPatom reports no atomicity violation if
there exists no atomicity violation; when McPatom reports some atomicity violation
traces, there may be additional atomicity violations not yet reported, which can be
detected by re-running McPatom after grouping the previously reported violation
related accesses into an atomic region so that it will not cause a new violation in the
next run. For each shared variable and each pair of threads, an atomicity violation
is recorded in a Spin trail ﬁle for each pattern if it exists. The Spin trail ﬁle can be
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sharedvar =0+13; /* mod_log_config.c -1353*/ |if (len+buf ->outcnt >LOG_BUFSIZE)
sharedvar =64+48; /* mod_log_config.c -1373*/| buf ->outcnt += len;
sharedvar =0+13; /* mod_log_config.c -1369*/ |s = &buf ->outbuf[buf ->outcnt]
Figure 4.8: Promela code and the corresponding real code in the original program
Table 4.1: Bug List
Bug # Program Issue Number
1 Apache 25520
2 Apache 21287
3 Apache 21285
4 MySQL 644
5 MySQL 791
6 Mozilla-extract Figure 4.5
simulated by Spin to give a clear view of those accesses involved in the atomicity
violation, as shown in Figure 4.7.
4.4.3 Mapping the violations reported in Spin to the original
program
Atomicity violations reported in Spin, as shown in Figure 4.7 as an example, are
mapped to real code in original program. McPatom automatically identiﬁes the
related lines in Promela ﬁles, in which the comments of each line in Promela are
ﬁle names and line numbers of the corresponding source code. Figure 4.8 shows
the Promela code at the left and the corresponding real code at the right, for the
atomicity violation in Figure 4.7.
4.5 Evaluation
We have used several real-world systems with known bugs listed in Table 4.1 (the is-
sue numbers are the IDs in corresponding Bugzilla Databases) ([10],[51]) to examine
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Table 4.2: Performance
Program Program Input
Trace
Size
(MB)
Time
to
Check
(mins)
Number
of
Shared
Vari-
ables
Number
of Prop-
erties
Average
Time per
Property
(secs)
1 ﬀt -p2 -m1024 4.3 304 3656 36560 0.499
2 fmm
Particles : 64
Processors : 2
10.8 183 1248 12480 0.88
3 lu -p2 -n16 0.3 0.44 5 50 0.53
4 radix -p2 -n10 3.7 328 3094 30940 0.636
5 Apache
2 concurrent
httperf
9.4 15.68 151 3360 0.005
Table 4.3: Performance (Continue)
Program
The Shared Variable with Maximum Number of Accesses
Number of Accesses Number of States Time to Check (secs)
1 ﬀt 1041 3294 0.04
2 fmm 20064 9996 0.08
3 lu 282 941 0.02
4 radix 81 433 0.01
5 Apache 1415 16 less than 0.01
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our tool's bug prediction capability, as well as four programs [10] without atomicity
violations in SPLASH-2 parallel benchmark suite [52] to test the accuracy of our
tool (no false positives are reported).
Bug prediction capability
McPatom has successfully predicted all the known bugs listed in Table 4.1, especially
bug number 6 - an extraction of a real world atomicity violation bug reported in
[51], which evades PSet [51] because this bug involves a set of last readers and the
current reading access, and AVIO [10] because this bug involves more than three
accesses.
Accuracy
We have chosen four programs (also used in [10]) without atomicity violations in
SPLASH-2 parallel benchmark suite [52] to test whether McPatom produces viola-
tion predictions, which would certainly be false positives. McPatom passed this test
without reporting any violations.
Performance
Since McPatom framework uses model checking as the underlying atomicity viola-
tion prediction method and relies on a third party tool, Spin, to perform the model
checking, it is extremely important to demonstrate the applicability of McPatom.
We conducted the experiments1 on a PC with dual core 2.33GHz CPU and 2GB
memory. Performance data are given in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, where time to
check included automatically running Spin, compiling generated pan.c and model
checking properties for all shared variables. There are ten properties to check for
1Data available at http://users.cs.ﬁu.edu/~rzeng001/spin12/
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each pair of threads accessing a shared variable based on ﬁve violation patterns
and their mutants. Apache program contains more than two threads and results in
more properties to be checked. Instrumentation overhead was similar to that given
in [10]. Table 4.3 shows the shared variable with maximum number of accesses in
each program. From Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, it shows that the number of states
does not explode when the number of accesses increases since checking the shared
variable with maximum number of accesses took less than 0.01 seconds (not includ-
ing the time to run Spin and compile generated pan.c) while checking any shared
variable on average took 0.005 seconds. These preliminary experimental results are
very encouraging and demonstrate the scalability of McPatom. These results also
conﬁrm our belief that although the total number of possible interleavings to check
can explode quickly as the number of accesses increase; however, the number of
actual interleavings are drastically smaller due to the constraints imposed by causal
relationships between threads. Other major reasons, which also vastly reduce the
possible interleavings, are that McPatom takes advantage of the nature of atomic-
ity violations and considers only a pair of threads and accesses to a single shared
variable at one time, groups all reading event sequences in each thread into atomic
blocks in Spin to achieve partial order reductions , and enforces the wait/signal
order of condition variables in the observed execution while exploring alternative
interleavings. Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 show that the experiment with Apache has
even better performance than others, due to Apache's heavy use of condition vari-
ables. Since atomicity violations involving a single shared variable can be checked
independently from violations involving other shared variables, we can signiﬁcantly
reduce the duration (not the cumulative time) of model checking by using multiple
machines.
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4.6 Related Works
There are many recent works on tackling atomicity violations. Some works proposed
techniques to detect atomicity violations on actual program executions through test-
ing [53] or runtime monitoring ([10], [54], and [55]). Other works developed methods
to predict atomicity violations that may evade testing and runtime monitoring. In
this section, we mention some recent works most relevant to ours on dynamically
predicting atomicity violations. Most of these works share the following fundamen-
tal process: (1) instruments a multi-thread program P to record atomicity relevant
events, (2) extracts a trace τ of atomicity relevant events from an interleaved exe-
cution σ of P , (3) projects trace τ into a partial order model M based on a causal
relation deﬁned on P , (4) explores various alternative trace τ ′ in M to predict po-
tential atomicity violations in a possible corresponding interleaved execution σ′ in
P. Various methods and their supporting tools diﬀer with regard to the strategies
used in the above process.
How to abstract a partial order modelM from a trace τ is critical. If the model is
too restrictive, many feasible atomicity violations cannot be explored. If the model
is too permissible, the prediction may not be sound, i.e. a predicted atomicity vio-
lation may not be a feasible interleaved execution of P. Penelope [56] ignores some
causal relationships in building a partial order model and thus requires additional
feasibility checking of a predicted atomicity violation. Fusion [12] abstracts a par-
tial order model called concurrent trace program (CTP) that ignores the causal
relation between diﬀerent threads. Linearized atomicity violation traces in CTP are
symbolically checked with additional order information from source codes to ensure
their feasibility. In [57], a theoretical study was conducted to analyze the complex-
ity of predicting atomicity violations, in which two simpliﬁed partial order models
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are considered. The ﬁrst one ignores all synchronization and the second one only
considers lock-based synchronization. It shows the tradeoﬀs between eﬃciency and
accuracy. jPredictor [58] deﬁnes a partial order model based on a concept of sliced
causality and lock-atomicity, which may predict some infeasible violations. Our
work abstracts a partial order model respecting the causal relationships imposed
by all synchronization constructs, but without considering data-ﬂow, our work also
may produce some infeasible violations.
A variety of techniques have been proposed to explore atomicity violation traces
from an abstract partial order model. CTrigger [11] and Penelope [56] developed
diﬀerent algorithms to generate potential violation schedules and to prune away
many infeasible ones. However these algorithms may report infeasible atomicity
violation traces as well as miss feasible ones. jPredictor [58] uses model checking to
exhaustively check a property in the partial order model and is capable to predict
other concurrency bugs in addition to atomicity violations. Fusion [12] encodes
the partial order model, the source program, and three access atomicity violation
patterns into a logic formula; and uses a satisﬁability modulo theory solver to check
the feasible interleavings for atomicity violations. Our work converts the partial
order model into a Promela program, deﬁnes a complete set of atomicity violation
patterns as temporal logic formulas, and then uses Spin model checker to produce
atomicity violation traces.
4.7 Summary
Concurrency bugs are extremely hard to detect using testing techniques due to huge
interleaving space. This chapter presents a tool McPatom using model checking
to predict atomicity violation concurrency bugs. McPatom is powerful and can
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explore a vast interleaving space of a multi-threaded program based on a small set
of instrumented test runs. McPatom is applicable to large real-world systems.
McPatom focuses on atomicity violations involving each single shared variable,
and thus cannot ﬁnd atomicity violations involving multiple variables. Another
limitation is that redundant model checking may be performed if two recorded in-
terleaved traces yield the same partial order thread model.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODS FOR IMPROVING THE COVERAGE AND PRECISION
OF MCPATOM
5.1 Overview
Multi-threaded programs are prone to bugs due to concurrency. Concurrency bugs
are hard to ﬁnd and reproduce because of the large number of interleavings. Most
non-deadlock concurrency bugs are atomicity violation bugs due to unprotected
accesses of shared variables by multiple threads. Existing approaches for detect-
ing atomicity violation are either static or dynamic. Static approaches [59] usually
suﬀers from a large number of false positives due to the complexity of analyzing con-
currency and pointer aliasing. Dynamic approaches are either monitor based meth-
ods that require atomicity violations to manifest during monitored runs [11][54][55],
or predictive methods that explore atomicity violations in alternative interleavings
from some observed runs [56][12][57][58].
Predictive methods use either (1) under-approximate models ([60][61][58][62]) by
analyzing only interleavings with the same read-after-write relationships as in the
observed executions, which are a subset of all feasible interleavings; or (2) over-
approximate models ([63][56][64][65][66]) by exploring not only all feasible inter-
leavings but also infeasible interleavings due to data constraints and ad-hoc syn-
chronization, which may produce false positives. Table 5.1 shows ten interleaving
scenarios of three accesses to a shared variable between two threads that will result
in atomicity violations, among which only ﬁve can be predicted by methods using
under-approximate models while the other ﬁve are missed because some of read-
after-write relationships within three accesses are broken. Hence methods based on
under-approximate models have inadequate coverage, and methods based on over-
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Figure 5.1: Comparison with other predictive methods on coverage and precision,
in which each oval stands for the traces that can be generated in the corresponding
method as explained below.
UA - Under-approximate methods [60][61][58][62].
PPA - Post-prediction analysis method in this chapter, e.g. Figure 5.3.
Replay - Methods of rescheduling predicted violation traces, e.g. Figure 5.9(c).
Real code - Real program code, captured in Concurrent Trace Programs [12].
OA - Over-approximate methods [63][56][64][65][66], e.g. Figures 5.2, 5.4, 5.8, and
5.9(b).
approximate models are not precise. Many predictive methods mentioned above
explored the tradeoﬀs between precision and coverage.
This chapter presents two methods for improving the coverage and precision of
atomicity violation predictions: 1) a post-prediction analysis method on relaxing the
under-approximate models to increase coverage while ensuring precision; 2) a follow-
up replaying method to further increase coverage. The post-prediction analysis
method is lightweight and fast, and makes the precise predictions and achieves
better coverage than other existing methods using under-approximate models. A
comparison with other methods is given in Figure 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Limited coverage of prediction using under-approximate models for two
threads (T1 and T2)
Observed
Execution
T1 T2
Predicted
Execution
T1 T2
Description of Unserializability
or Missed Reason
C
ov
er
ed
R
R
W
R
W
R
Two reading accesses read from
diﬀerent writes
R
W
W
R
W
W
Forwarded writing access in T2
is overwritten
W
W
W
W
W
W
Forwarded writing access in T2
is overwritten
R
W
W
W
R
W
An intermediate value is read
W
W
W
W
W
W
Forwarded writing access in T1
is overwritten
M
is
se
d
W
R
W
None
Intra-thread read-after-write in
T1 prohibits interleaved writing
in T2
W
W
R
None
Inter-thread read-after-write
prohibits forwarded reading in
T2
W
R
R
None
Inter-thread read-after-write
prohibits forwarded reading in
T1
W
W
R
None
Intra-thread read-after-write in
T1 prohibits interleaved writing
in T2
W
R
W
None
Inter-thread read-after-write
prohibits forwarded reading in
T1
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5.2 Preliminaries
A multi-threaded program has a set of threads and a set of shared variables. An
observed execution σ = s1, ..., sn of a multi-threaded program P is a sequence of
executed statements. A trace is the projection of an execution to a sequence of
annotated shared variable accesses and synchronization events. Formally, a trace,
τ = e1, ..., em is a sequence of events where each event ei(1 ≤ i ≤ m) is a tuple
〈seqi, tidi, actioni, bri〉 in which seqi is an increasing sequence number, tidi is a thread
handle, actioni is either an atomic shared variable access or a synchronization event,
and bri is the number of branches between ei and its immediate preceding event
within the same thread. Given a trace τ = e1, ..., em, a partial order thread model
(Eτ ,≺) can be deﬁned, where Eτ is the set of events occurring in τ and ≺ is a causal
relation on Eτ . The causal relation ≺ respects all constraints of synchronization
primitives and thread-local program orders. Sequential consistency is assumed in
this chapter, as it is typically accepted by other related works. A feasible atomicity
violation prediction in sequential consistent memory models is also feasible in other
memory models.
Deﬁnition 11. A predicted atomicity violation in an interleaved trace τ ′ in (Eτ ,≺)
is a true violation if and only if it is contained in a feasible execution σ′.
The strength of the causal relation ≺ aﬀects the size of possible interleaved
traces in (Eτ ,≺). When the same read-after-write relation in τ is enforced in ≺,
any predicted atomicity violation trace τ ′ is feasible. Such partial order thread
models are under-approximate and may miss feasible interleaved traces. On the
other hand, not enforcing the same read-after-write relation in τ within ≺ results in
over-approximate thread models that contain all feasible interleaved traces as well
as infeasible ones.
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5.3 Post-prediction analysis
Methods using under-approximate models make precise (only feasible) atomicity
violation predictions but have limited coverage (missing other feasible atomicity
violations). This section introduces a post-prediction analysis method to improve
the coverage while ensuring precision. The under-approximate models can be relaxed
to become over-approximate models through removing the read-after-write relations
imposed by the observed execution. Our post-prediction analysis method works on
over-approximate models to remove false positives while achieving more coverage
than methods using under-approximate models. This analysis method is general and
is applicable to the prediction results from other methods using over-approximate
models. The only information needed is an observed trace τ and three memory
accesses in τ that forms an atomicity violation pattern in a predicted alternative
trace [63][12].
5.3.1 Data constraints causing false predictions
Data constraints concern data dependencies that may make a predicted atomicity
violation trace infeasible, such as the branch conditions that are dependent on shared
variables and queue accesses that are dependent on shared indexing variables. Figure
5.2 gives an example of data constraints that need to be taken into consideration
when analyzing an atomicity violation prediction. Figure 5.2(a) shows a trace of an
observed execution, in which shared variable index is read in line 7 and line 8 after
a writing of index in line 3, and hence there are data dependencies in two pairs of
accesses to index: line 3 and line 7, line 3 and line 8. Figure 5.2(b) shows a trace of
a predicted atomicity violation, in which line 10 has a writing access to the shared
memory item in Thread T2 between the reading (line 1R) access and writing access
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Figure 5.2: An example of data constraint analysis for false positives (extracted
from Apache)
(line 1W) in Thread T1. However, both pairs of accesses to index above are broken,
which makes the memory access in line 10 in the observed trace infeasible in the
predicted atomicity violation trace.
A perfect solution to the above problem requires a precise and complete partial
order thread model extracted from the observed trace. The precision ensures the
feasibility of any predicted atomicity violation in the partial order thread model, and
the completeness requires any feasible atomicity violation remain in the partial order
thread model. Enforcing all the read-after-write relations can ensure the precision of
the partial order thread models. Several methods [61][62] introduced the read-after-
write relations as a simple solution to ensure the precision. However, the constraints
imposed by read-after-write relations are too strong, thus make the resulting partial
order thread model over restrictive and under-approximate. Figure 5.3 shows an
example in which a real bug is missed if all the read-after-write relations are enforced,
because the reading access can be moved forward to read from a diﬀerent writing
access.
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Figure 5.3: A real bug is missed due to a read-after-write relationship
5.3.2 Ad-hoc synchronization causing false predictions
Ad-hoc synchronization is often used to ensure an intended execution order of certain
memory accesses. Speciﬁcally, instead of calling condition variable routines or using
other synchronization primitives, programmers often use ad-hoc loops to synchronize
a shared variable. A trace containing an ad-hoc synchronization includes a sequence
of reading accesses and a writing access, in which there is also a read-after-write
relationship as the data constraints discussed above. Figure 5.4 gives an example
of false positives related to an ad-hoc synchronization. (a) is an observed trace, in
which there is a sequence of reading accesses from line 2 to n+2 where n ≥ 0, and a
writing access in line n+1. Line n+2 reads after the writing in line n+1. (b) shows
a predicted atomicity violation trace, in which n+3R is a1i′ , line 1W is a
2
j′ , and line
n+3W is b1k′ . Line n+2 is a moved forward reading r
1 as the case (1) in Lemma 6,
which breaks the read-after-write relationship between line n+1 and line n+2 in the
observed trace in (a). It is obvious the atomicity violation trace (b) is infeasible.
Thus the read-after-write relations in ad-hoc synchronization need to be enforced.
We treat ad-hoc synchronizations as a special case of data constraints discussed in
Section 5.3.1.
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Figure 5.4: A false positive related to an ad-hoc synchronization
5.3.3 Problem formulation
The method proposed in this section aims at avoiding false atomicity violation pre-
dictions while catching as many real bugs as possible. Our method works on over-
approximate models to remove false positives while achieving more coverage than
methods using under-approximate models.
During post-prediction analysis, any predicted atomicity violation trace is an
alternative interleaving respecting the same causal relations imposed by the syn-
chronization events as the original observed trace. Thus we can view a trace as a
sequence of atomic (reading or writing) accesses without synchronization events to
simplify the discussion. Let τ = at11 , a
t2
2 , ..., a
tn
n be a sequence of atomic accesses to
share variables in an interleaved execution of two threads, in which a superscript
indicates the thread an event belongs to, thus ti ∈ {1, 2} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and a
subscript indicates the occurrence position of an event in the interleaved trace.
Over-approximate methods in [63][11][56] were based on three-access atomicity
violation patterns a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ , where a
1
i′ and a
1
k′ are atomic accesses to a shared
variable x in thread 1 and a2j′ is an atomic access to x in thread 2. Table 5.1 gives
all possible scenarios that will result in atomicity violation patterns after reordering
the event in thread 2 to occur between the two events in thread 1.
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A predicted atomicity violation trace in over-approximate methods is τ ′ = ..., a1i′ ,
..., a2j′ , ..., a
1
k′ , ... with atomicity violation pattern a
1
i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ which are three consec-
utive accesses to a shared variable x. τ ′ is the result of reordering some accesses
in a given original observed trace τ such that (1) τ = ..., a1i , ..., a
1
k, ..., a
2
j , ... or (2)
τ = ..., a2j , ..., a
1
i , ..., a
1
k, ..., and thus may break the read-after-write relations in τ .
Note that accesses other than a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ are not explicitly identiﬁed in τ
′ but may
also be reordered due to reordered a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ , and the exact positions of i
′, j′, k′ in
τ ′ are not important. The corresponding i, j, k are the exact positions where three
accesses to x occurred in τ . τ may contain many other accesses to shared variables
including x. τ ′ is considered feasible if its preﬁx up to a1k′ is feasible since anything
happens after a1k′ does not aﬀect the feasibility of τ
′. Not all broken read-after-write
relations due to reordering aﬀect the feasibility of τ ′, but some does.
5.3.4 Our method
The underlying idea of our method is checking whether any reordered event due
to reordered a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ may break read-after-write relations in the original trace.
Before reordering, a2j may happen after a
1
k, or before a
1
i . The idea of our method
is explained below assuming a2j happens after a
1
k, i.e. a
1
i 99K a1k 99K a2j , in Figures
5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. w and r are used to describe a read-after-write relationship with
regard to a shared variable other than the one in a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ . In Figure 5.5, a reading
event r2 is moved forward due to reordering of a2j , thus breaking the read-after-write
relationship between w1 and r2.
In Figures 5.6 and 5.7, Prev(a2j) denotes the immediate preceding access to the
same shared variable as a2j . In Figure 5.6, due to reordered a
1
i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ , Prev(a
2
j) is
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Figure 5.5: Read-after-write relationship is broken, assuming a1i 99K a1k 99K a2j and
a moved forward reading event before a1k′ .
moved forward to happen before a1i′ , thus r
2 is moved forward to happen before w1,
causing the read-after-write relationship between w1 and r2 is broken.
In Figure 5.7, due to reordered a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ , Prev(a
2
j) is moved forward to happen
before a1i′ , thus w
2 is moved forward to happen before r1 instead of happening after
r1, causing the read-after-write relationship between r1 and its original deﬁning
writing access is broken.
Based on ideas above, Lemmas 5 and 6 identify all cases in which a reordered
event may aﬀect the feasibility of τ ′. Let τ(a, b) be accesses in τ that occur after
a and before b, τ [a, b) be accesses in τ(a, b) including a, and τ(a, b] be accesses in
τ(a, b) including b, a 99K b denote event a occurs before event b, Prev(ai) denote
the immediate preceding atomic access to the same shared variable as a in thread
i, and Next(ai) denote the immediate succeeding atomic access to the same shared
variable as a in thread i.
Lemma 5. Given a predicted atomicity violation trace τ ′ = ..., a1i′ , ..., a
2
j′ , ..., a
1
k′ , ...
with atomicity violation pattern a1i′ ,a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ with regard to a shared variable x, and
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Figure 5.6: Read-after-write relationship is broken, assuming a1i 99K a1k 99K a2j and
a moved forward reading event before a1i′ .
Figure 5.7: Read-after-write relationship is broken, assuming a1i 99K a1k 99K a2j and
a moved forward writing event.
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the original observed trace τ = ..., a1i , ..., a
1
k, ..., a
2
j , .... τ
′ may be infeasible due to
a violated data constraint (a broken read-after-write relationship) caused by one of
the following cases (1) a moved forward reading event in thread 2: r2∈τ(a1k, a2j) and
r2 99K a1k′; (2) a moved forward reading event in thread 2: r2 ∈ τ(a1i , P rev(a2j)] and
r2 99K a1i′; or (3) a moved forward writing event in thread 2: w2∈τ(a1i , P rev(a2j)],
w2 99K a1i′ and there is some branch instruction between τ [a1i , a1k).
Proof. Given the observed trace τ = ..., a1i , ..., a
1
k, ..., a
2
j ,..., to obtain the violation
trace τ ′ = ..., a1i′ , ..., a
2
j′ , ..., a
1
k′ , ..., all access events in thread 2 between k and j are
moved before k′ (we can assume k′ = j′ + 1 since the violation trace is reported as
soon as a violation pattern occurs, and thus do not need to consider any thread 2
event after j). Some access events in thread 2 between i and k may be moved before
i′ (we can assume the last thread 2 event need to move before i′ is Prev(a2j) since
the violation pattern is reached as long as there is no other access to x in thread 2
between i′ and j′). We analyze all such needed moves and their impact below: (1)
for a moved forward reading event: r2∈τ(a1k, a2j) and r2 99K a1k′ : if there is a writing
event w1 in thread 1 accessing the same shared variable as r2 such that w1∈τ(a1k, a2j)
and w1 99K r2 in τ . The read-after-write relationship w1 99K r2 in τ is broken since
a1k′ 99K w1 in τ ′. As a result, the new value of r2 may make τ ′[a2j′ , a1k′ ] infeasible;
(2) a moved forward reading event in thread 2: r2 ∈ τ(a1i , P rev(a2j)] and r2 99K a1i′ :
if there is a writing event w1 in thread 1 accessing the same shared variable as r2
such that w1∈τ(a1i , P rev(a2j)] and w1 99K r2 in τ . The read-after-write relationship
w1 99K r2 in τ is broken since a1i′ 99K w1 in τ ′. As a result, the new value of
r2 may make τ ′[a1i′ , a
2
j′ ] infeasible; (3) a moved forward writing event in thread 2:
w2∈τ(a1i , P rev(a2j)] and w2 99K a1i′ : if there is a reading event r1 ∈ τ [a1i , a1k) in
thread 1 accessing the same shared variable as w2 such that r1 99K w2 in τ ′. This
new read-after-write relationship may break the old read-after-write relationship of
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r1. However, the new value of r1 does not aﬀect the execution of any thread 2 event
within τ(r1, a1k′) in τ
′, but may aﬀect the execution of some thread 1 event between
τ [r1, a1k′ ], which can happen in two cases: (i) if the new value of r
1 is used in some
branch instruction between τ [a1i , a
1
k); (ii) if the new value of r
1 directs the access
at a1k′ to a diﬀerent shared variable when the memory address of the access at a
1
k′
depends on the value of r1, a new atomicity violation pattern r′1, w2, r1 on shared
variable y occurs, which makes τ ′ a feasible atomicity violation trace. As a result,
the new value of r1 may make τ ′[a1i′ , a
1
k′ ] infeasible only if the new value of r
1 is used
in some branch instruction between τ [a1i , a
1
k).
Note a moved forward writing event in thread 2: w2∈τ [Prev(a2j), a1k) and w2 99K
a1k′ may break read-after-write relationships after a
1
k′ , but does not aﬀect the feasi-
bility of τ ′.
Figure 5.2 shows an example of case (1) in Lemma 5, where the predicted atom-
icity violation trace τ ′ in (b) is an infeasible alternative interleaving of the original
observed trace τ in (a). In (b) line 1R is a1i′ , line 10 is a
2
j′ , line 1W is a
1
k′ , and line
7 is the moved forward reading r. Its read-after-write relationship with line 3 is
broken. As a result, the condition in line 7 is true and Wait is executed that makes
τ ′ infeasible.
Lemma 6. Given a predicted atomicity violation trace τ ′ = ..., a1i′ , ..., a
2
j′ , ..., a
1
k′ , ...
with atomicity violation pattern a1i′ ,a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ with regard to a shared variable x, and
the original observed trace τ = ..., a2j , ..., a
1
i , ..., a
1
k, .... τ
′ may be infeasible due to
a violated data constraint (a broken read-after-write relationship) caused by one of
the following cases (1) a moved forward reading event in thread 1: r1∈τ(a2j , a1i ] and
r1 99K a2j′; (2) a moved forward reading event in thread 1: r1 ∈ τ(Next(a2j), a1k)] ,
r1 99K Next(a2j′), and there is some branch instruction between τ [a1i , a1k).
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Figure 5.8: A false positive due to local dependency
Proof. The proof of case (1) is similar to that in Lemma 5 and is omitted here. In
case (2), only a thread 1 reading event r1 ∈ τ(Next(a2j), a1k)] needs to be moved
forward to reach the violation pattern such that Next(a2j) appears after a
1
k′ in τ
′.
However, the new value of r1 does not aﬀect the execution of any thread 2 event
in τ(r1, a1k′) in τ
′, but may aﬀect the execution of some thread 1 event between
τ [r1, a1k′ ], which can only happen if the new value of r
1 is used in some branch
instruction between τ [a1i , a
1
k) as shown in the proof of Lemma 5. As a result, the
new value of r1 may make τ ′[a1i′ , a
1
k′ ] infeasible.
Note any moved forward writing event in thread 1 does not aﬀect the feasibility
of τ ′.
Figure 5.8 shows an example of case (1) in Lemma 6, where the predicted atom-
icity violation trace τ ′ in (b) is an infeasible alternative interleaving of the original
observed trace τ in (a). In (b), line 3 is a1i′ , line 2 is a
2
j′ , line 5 is a
1
k′ , and line
3 is the moved forward reading r1∈τ(a2j , a1i ] , which broke the old read-after-write
relationship from line 2, and now reads a new value 0. As a result, b1k′ will not be
executed and thus τ ′ is infeasible.
Figure 5.3 shows another example, which is not infeasible according to of case
(1) in Lemma 6.
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Lemmas 5 and 6 deﬁne the necessary conditions that a violated data constraint (a
broken read-after-write relationship) can occur and thus makes a predicted atomicity
violation trace infeasible. Thus Lemmas 5 and 6 have ensured that any surviving
predicted atomicity violation trace is a feasible one. Our post-prediction analysis
method ensures precision while eliminating only a subset of predicted atomicity
violation traces breaking the read-after-write relations in the original observed trace.
5.3.5 Algorithm of post-prediction analysis
An observed trace contains a sequence of events, and each event is deﬁned by a
thread identiﬁer tid, a memory access type (read or write) rw, a shared variable
var, and the number br of branches between this event and its immediate preceding
event within the same thread. Other ﬁelds in an observed trace are omitted here
without aﬀecting the post-prediction analysis. An atomicity violation prediction is
based on an atomicity violation pattern a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ involving two threads 1 and 2.
The algorithm shown in Algorithm 5.1 analyzes the feasibility of a predicted violation
according to Lemmas 5 and 6. Five true returns in the algorithm correspond to the
ﬁve cases in Lemmas 5 and 6.
5.4 Replay
Post-prediction analysis on predicted violation traces, while making prediction pre-
cise and reducing possible missing real bugs, may still miss real bugs due to the
lacking of complete data dependencies. Replaying validates a predicted violation
execution trace by orchestrating thread scheduling in a concrete execution for a
given input, can be used to alone to eliminate infeasible traces, or used after post-
prediction analysis to validate the feasibility of uncertain traces.
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Algorithm 5.1 Algorithm of post-prediction analysis
Input: τ : seq → (tidseq, rwseq, varseq, brseq), and three seq: ...a1i ..., ...a2j ..., ...a1k...
that contain accesses relevant to a violation pattern a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ in τ
′.
Output: Whether a predicted violation maybe infeasible.
1: if a2j > a
1
i then
2: prev ← max(seq) where tidseq = 2∧varseq = vara2j∧seq < a2j
3: for r ∈ (a1i , prev] ∪ (a1k, a2j) ∧ rwr = read ∧ tidr = 2 do
4: w = max(seq) where rwseq = write ∧ varseq = varr ∧ seq < r
5: if r ∈ (a1i , prev] ∧ w > a1i ∧ tidw = 1 then
6: return True
7: end if
8: if r ∈ (a1k, a2j) ∧ w > a1k ∧ tidw = 1 then
9: return True
10: end if
11: end for
12: for r ∈ [a1i , a1k) ∧ rwr = read ∧ tidr = 1 do
13: w = min(seq) where rwseq = write ∧ varseq = varr ∧ seq > r ∧ tidw = 2
14: if w ≤ prev ∧ ∃seq  (r < seq < a1k) ∧ (tidseq = 1) ∧ brseq > 0 then
15: return True
16: end if
17: end for
18: end if
19: if a2j < a
1
i then
20: for r ∈ (a2j , a1i ] ∧ rwr = read ∧ tidr = 1 do
21: w = max(seq) where rwseq = write ∧ varseq = varr ∧ seq < r
22: if w ≥ a2j ∧ tidw = 2 then
23: return True
24: end if
25: end for
26: next← min(seq) where tidseq = 2∧varseq = vara2j∧seq > a2j
27: for r ∈ (a1i , a1k) ∧ rwr = read ∧ tidr = 1 do
28: w = max(seq) where rwseq = write ∧ varseq = varr ∧ seq < r ∧ tidw = 2
29: if w > next ∧ ∃seq  (r < seq < a1k) ∧ (tidseq = 1) ∧ brseq > 0 then
30: return True
31: end if
32: end for
33: end if
34: return False
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Figure 5.9: An example of replay related to data constraints
Figure 5.9 gives an example of data constraints, in which x is a shared variable.
In the ﬁgure, (a) is an observed execution in which there are no interleaved accesses
between line 1 and line 2; (b) and (c) are violation traces predicted based on over-
approximate methods [63]. Both (b) and (c) break the read-after-write relationships
between line 2 and line 3, and are classiﬁed as uncertain (maybe infeasible) traces
by post-prediction analysis. During replay, (b) is recognized as a false positive since
line 5 cannot be executed because the branch condition is not satisﬁed, and (c) is
conﬁrmed as violation trace.
Given atomicity violation trace τ ′ = ..., a1i′ , ..., a
2
j′ , ..., a
1
k′ , ... with atomicity vio-
lation pattern a1i′ , a
2
j′ , a
1
k′ , we insert two signal-wait pairs in the following way: a
signal after a1i′ , a wait before a
2
j′ , a signal after a
2
j′ and a wait before a
1
k′ . The
memory access order will be enforced to let atomicity violation manifest; however,
as shown in Figure 5.10(a), there can be a deadlock even for a feasible prediction.
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Figure 5.10: Replaying need considering mutex
Thread T2 ﬁrstly acquires the lock then wait for a signal, while thread T1 cannot
acquire the lock thus not be able to issue a signal, as a result, the two threads
cannot make any progress and run into a deadlock. Therefore, mutex locks need to
be taken into consideration when inserting instructions for enforcing the predicted
interleaving. Let L11 and L
2
2 be two sets of locks acquired before a
1
i′ and between
a1i′and a
2
j′ respectively, L = L
1
1 ∩ L22, and let FirstLock(L) be the instruction for
the ﬁrst lock acquiring in L, LastUnlock(L) be the instruction for the last lock
releasing in L. If L 6= ∅, instead of inserting a signal-wait pair as described earlier,
we insert a signal after LastUnlock(L) and a wait before FirstLock(L). We deﬁne
and insert another signal-wait pair similarly between a2j′ and a
1
k′ . An example is
shown in Figure 5.10(b).
A potential problem with above inserted signal-wait pair is that the modiﬁed
program may run into deadlocks, livelocks and missing memory accesses, as shown in
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Figure 5.11. Figure 5.11(a) shows a deadlock, a signal-wait pair is inserted between
line 3 and 2, and there exists an ad-hoc synchronization implemented by a shared
variable done. T2 is waiting on T1 to set the ﬂag done, while T1 is waiting on T2
as required by the predicted interleaving, it results a circular wait. Figure 5.11(b)
shows a missing memory access, the predicted violation trace expects the memory
access in line 2 interleaves between memory accesses in line 3 and line 5. However,
line 5 together with inserted instructions are not executed at all as the condition
in line 4 is not satisﬁed, so replaying misses a memory access and is not able to
observe the predicted interleaving. Figure 5.11(c) shows a livelock in which T1
can not make progress while T2 continues as normal, because line 5 together with
inserted instructions are not executed.
A simple solution is to use timeout mechanism to detect deadlocks and livelocks
caused by inserted signal-wait instructions, and to check signal-wait pairs in observed
replaying to detect missing memory accesses. If a deadlock, or a livelock or some
missing memory accesses are detected, the predicted interleaving is not feasible and
is marked as a false positive; otherwise, replaying continues as usually without a
large number of context switches.
5.5 Experiments and Evaluation
We have implemented the proposed algorithm in a prototype tool based on the tool
in [63] and conducted several experiments. The tool is automatic such that it only
requires running a use case of the target executable as the manual step. During our
experiments for the replaying method, predicted traces of known atomicity viola-
tions in [63] and Table 5.3 can be validated through replaying successfully, while all
other predicted violation traces cannot be replayed due to data constraints. Our ex-
123
Figure 5.11: False positives pruned out by replaying
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Table 5.2: Experimental Results using Apache and FFmpeg
Program-Size Events_in_Trace OA PPA PPA-time
Apache 1.5 MB 140532 155 1 12.1 sec
FFmpeg 41 MB 550352 29 0 11.6 sec
periments for post-prediction analysis PPA used the benchmarks in [12], Apache web
server and FFmpeg audio/video codec library. The sequel in this section discusses
the experiments for PPA.
The results of experiments using Apache and FFmpeg are shown in Table 5.2,
and the results of experiments using the benchmarks in [12] are shown in Table 5.3.
In Table 5.2, Apache has a known atomicity violation bug but FFmpeg does not.
The ﬁrst column Program-Size gives the size of the executable, the second column
Events_in_Trace lists the number of events in the trace; the third column OA
contains the number of prediction by the over-approximate method McPatom; the
fourth column PPA is the number of prediction by post-prediction analysis PPA; the
last column PPA-time is the time in seconds to perform post-prediction analysis.
In Table 5.3, Programs atom001 and atom002 have atomicity violations that
are extracted from a real bug [10]. Their modiﬁed versions without atomicity vi-
olations are atom001a and atom002a. Other programs are Linux/Pthreads/C im-
plementation of the parameterized bank example [67], in which program bank-av-8
has atomicity violations; program bank-sav-8 adds a condition variable as a partial
ﬁx without avoiding all atomicity violations for any shared variable; and program
bank-nav-8 adds a transaction lock to remove all atomicity violations. The ﬁrst
three columns provide the statistics of programs, in which svars-causing-av is the
number of shared variables that cause atomicity violations. The next three columns
provide the statistics of our method, which uses the results of an over-approximate
method McPatom [63]. OA-svars is the number of shared variables that cause atom-
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icity violations predicted by over-approximate methods, PPA-svars is the number
of shared variables predicted by post-prediction analysis PPA that cause atomicity
violations and PPA-time is the running time in seconds. The last three columns
are statistics provided in [12], in which hb-pavs is the number of predicted atomicity
violation traces and sym-avs is the number of feasible atomicity violation traces out
of hb-pavs obtained from using symbolic method CTP. Note that a single shared
variable may generate many possible atomicity violations traces, which can often
be ﬁxed in a single ﬁx. We count shared variables in PPA-svars that have at least
one feasible predicted violation trace. The last column UA-avs is the number of
predicted atomicity violation traces by under-approximate methods that enforce all
read-after-write relations.
Lightweight and fast
The running times in Table 5.3 show our method's scalability is promising compared
to that of the symbolic method CTP. When the size of programs grows, e.g. bank-
nav-8 contains more code than others, the formulas built in CTP also grow bigger
and require more time to be solved. Our method stops as soon as a broken read-after-
write relation deﬁned in Lemmas 5 or 6 is detected, incurs insigniﬁcant time increase
when the size of a program grows, and thus can handle much larger programs.
Our method is also evaluated using the complete Apache web server and FFmpeg
audio/video codec library, as shown in Table 5.2, in which the running times show
the scalability of our method is promising for large scale software.
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Precise predictions and better coverage
The results show that our method reports no false positives while reporting more real
bugs than under-approximate methods. Thus our method is precise and improves
coverage. One shared variable in atom002 is missed due to read-after-write relations
of accesses to other shared variables. Our method cannot decide whether it is feasible
because the value of a shared variable or a local variable depending on the value
of a shared variable aﬀects the feasibility. [12] collects and encodes all program
information in CTP and thus can detect it.
5.6 Related Works
5.6.1 Post-prediction analysis
The post-prediction analysis method in this chapter achieves precision and improves
coverage by reducing the number of missing real bugs compared to other precise
methods. Under-approximate models such as [61][58][62] admit only interleavings
with the same read-after-write relations as in the observed executions to achieve pre-
cision; however, the constraints imposed by read-after-write relations are too strong,
thus make the model over restrictive and may miss real bugs. Over-approximate
models such as [63][56][64][65][66] admit not only all feasible interleavings but also
infeasible interleavings due to data constraints and ad-hoc synchronization, thus
make prediction imprecise due to false positives. [60] allows broken read-after-write
relations but prohibits the thread with such a read event to continue, hence can be
considered as an under-approximate model.
CTP [12] is an analysis tool applicable to the predicted violation traces gener-
ated by over-approximate methods, thus is the most relevant work to ours. CTP
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achieves precision and complete coverage by using the values of shared variables
and local variables in the predicted atomicity violation trace, which requires heavy
instrumentation and the static analysis of source code of expressions. Our method
explores ways to ensure precision and to improve coverage while avoiding heavy
instrumentation and the static analysis of source code.
5.6.2 Replay
Penelope [56] instruments the scheduler to follow a predicted schedule, from which
it gets a set of threads and the number of steps that each thread should take before
next context switch. Similar to us, the way it counts steps is also based on the
events that were monitored during an observed execution. Only after execution
reaches the point that the violation pattern is executed, the scheduler releases all
threads to execute as they normally do. Thus, before it reaches the point, it has to
pay the same overhead as an observed execution, and in addition the overhead of
instrumenting scheduler.
Maple [68] memoizes tested interleavings and tries to expose untested interleav-
ings for a given test input to increase interleaving coverage. The predicted untested
interleavings are exposed by controlling the thread schedule during execution for the
test input. In Maple, the active scheduler takes the test input and forces all threads
to run on a single processor, and therefore records the order of the thread schedule.
CHESS [53] is a systematic and deterministic testing tool for concurrent pro-
grams. It takes complete control over scheduling of threads. However, its scheduler
is non-preemptive , therefore cannot model the behavior of a real scheduler that
may preempt a thread at any point in its execution.
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Existing works mentioned above need heavy context switches. However, even fol-
lowing exactly the same schedule of a predicted atomicity violation trace using heavy
context switches cannot guarantee perfect replaying. Perfect replaying is impossi-
ble without capturing all sources of nondeterminism, as demonstrated in [69][70][71].
Our method reduces context switches to the minimal level by allowing nondetermin-
ism while trying to ensure the determinism of events related to predicted atomicity
violations. In case of a large number of predicted atomicity violation traces, our
method performs post-prediction analysis ﬁrst to eﬀectively and signiﬁcantly reduce
the number of replays needed.
5.7 Summary
Predictive methods for atomicity violations need to consider the tradeoﬀs between
precision and coverage. This chapter presented a post-prediction analysis method
and a replaying method to ensure the precision and improve the coverage of predicted
atomicity violation traces generated from over-approximate methods. The post-
prediction analysis method covers all ten scenarios in Table 5.1. The replaying
method reduces context switches to the minimal level to improve scalability. Figure
5.1 compares our methods with other predictive methods on coverage and precision,
in which our post-prediction analysis method PPA improves coverage while ensuring
precision, our replaying method further improves coverage and ensures precision as
well. Both methods does not rely on the instrumentation of local variables and the
analysis of source code. Therefore, our methods are scalable and applicable to large
programs.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary
This dissertation presents methods and tools for modeling and analyzing concurrent
software systems at design and code levels, to improve reliability of concurrent
software. At design level, we build a formal speciﬁcation of Mondex using Petri
nets, and provide a way of using model checking to verify the formal speciﬁcation of
Mondex, including the abstract model and concrete model. We also develop methods
to mine traces to build Petri nets automatically to aid designing scientiﬁc workﬂows.
At code level, we develop methods and tools to predict atomicity violation bugs using
binary instrumentation and model checking techniques.
Our method for mining traces to build Petri nets is based on provenance of scien-
tiﬁc workﬂows, and mine both data and control dependency. The mining result can
either suggest part of others' workﬂows for consideration, or make familiar part of
workﬂow easily accessible, thus provide recommendation support for scientiﬁc work-
ﬂows composition, which oﬀers a new approach to build workﬂows in the context
of scientiﬁc workﬂows. Given the fact that provenance captured in any scientiﬁc
workﬂow based systems or system level monitoring systems contains information
about tasks and their temporal order, the proposed algorithm can give both control
and data dependency for recommendation during scientiﬁc workﬂows composition.
Our tool McPatom, using model checking to predict atomicity violation concur-
rency bugs, is powerful and can explore a vast interleaving space of a multi-threaded
program based on a small set of instrumented test runs. McPatom is applicable
to large real-world systems. Predictive methods for atomicity violations need to
consider the tradeoﬀs between precision and coverage. Our post-prediction anal-
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ysis method and our replaying method are presented to ensure the precision and
improve the coverage of predicted atomicity violation traces generated from over-
approximate methods. The post-prediction analysis method covers all ten possible
scenarios. The replaying method reduces context switches to the minimal level to
improve scalability. Comparing to other predictive methods on coverage and pre-
cision, our post-prediction analysis method PPA improves coverage while ensuring
precision, our replaying method further improves coverage and ensures precision as
well. Both methods does not rely on the instrumentation of local variables and the
analysis of source code. Therefore, our methods are scalable and applicable to large
programs. The experiment result shows the scalability of our methods is promising
compared to related works.
6.2 Future Work
In our tool McPatom, although the extracted thread model contains all equivalent
interleavings that have the same happen-before relationships as the instrumented
interleaved trace, there can be other interleaved traces containing diﬀerent happen-
before relationships involving other pairs of threads due to branching structures in
a concurrent program. Thus in order to predict all potential atomicity violations,
enough instrumented interleaved traces need to be captured during test runs of the
program. In a word, existing works on atomicity violation prediction check one path
at a time, however, it is desired for predictive analysis to reason on entire families
of paths. Additional methods can be developed in the future work, to improve the
branch coverage toward the completeness of predicting atomicity violations.
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